WHAT'S IN A NAME? THE DISPARATE EFFECTS OF IDENTIFIABILITY ON OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT

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Sexual harassment is undergoing an identification revolution, as more victims choose to forego their anonymity and divulge their identity to the public. Research in social psychology on the identifiability effect *appears to support victims' own public disclosure, as identified victims typically generate more empathy and support than unidentified ones. However, this research has been limited largely to monetary donations or to unambiguous cases with uncontested facts; the scholarship has not examined the effects of varying the identifiability of both parties to a conflict.*

In three large-scale experiments with a representative population (total N = 3,988), we found that in the context of sexual harassment, victims do not gain an identifiability 'premium'—whereas offenders do. Offenders identified by their first name only are regarded as more credible and moral and less blameworthy and responsible for the event than unidentified offenders, but the same does not apply to identified victims. Furthermore, when the offender is identified, fewer people perceive the case as involving sexual harassment (Experiment 1), and support for taking measures against the offender declines (Experiment 2). Finally, the identified offender premium exists for offenders of both sexes, but the detrimental effect of identification on victims is moderated by the victim's mode *of identification. Specifically, identified female victims who stated willingness to disclose their name publicly fared worse than those preferring that their name not be revealed in public, and the difference between active and passive identification reversed for male victims. The effect of identification mode is moderated by sexist beliefs (Experiment 3). Our results have normative implications for the appropriate balance between publicity and anonymity in various contexts, including social networks, the media, and disciplinary and judicial tribunals.*

I. Introduction

At present, the fight against sexual harassment seems to be in full swing. What began with the individual initiative of a few women—notably actresses such as Ashley Judd and Alyssa Milano—who came forward with their personal stories, gained great momentum worldwide. Extensive media coverage and the hashtag #MeToo used by millions of people have brought the issue of sexual misconduct to the forefront of public attention. As a result, powerful, longtime offenders—like movie mogul Harvey Weinstein—were forced to resign from their position (for a short survey of the high-profile incidents giving rise to the #MeToo movement, see Wexler, Robbennolt, and Murphy 2018). Indeed, *Time* magazine chose the people who broke the silence around this pervasive social problem collectively as its 2017 'Person of the Year.'[1] Most of the persons depicted in the Time article appear with their full name and large (sometimes full-page) color photograph. Although the article features testimonies from low-profile individuals as well, such as a dishwasher or a hotel housekeeper, the vast majority of interviewees are successful or even famous professionals, including movie and media stars, artists, engineers, politicians, university professors, and journalists. Interestingly, the two women to maintain anonymity (and thus photographed from the back) belong to the former group: a hospital worker and an office assistant; and the immigrant strawberry picker whose photo (from the front) appears on the cover of the magazine used a pseudonym.

In general, information about alleged offenders and victims of sexual misconduct comes in varying degrees of anonymity or identification from the perspective of its recipients.[2] Thus, in a newspaper report, a TV program, or an online blog, both parties may be anonymous; both may be identified; or only one party may be identified while the other (either the victim or the

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[1] See http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2017-silence-breakers/. At the same time, concerns have been raised about lack of due process and disproportionate consequences for some of the people accused of sexual misconduct. For discussion of this issue, see Wexler, Robbennolt and Murphy 2018.

[2] For the sake of simplicity, we hereafter use the terms "victim" and "offender" in a broad manner, which encompasses the person complaining about sexual harassment and the person accused of sexual harassment, respectively. These terms should not be understood as necessarily implying that the alleged victim had been harassed by the alleged offender. Indeed, our experimental vignettes examined people's judgments about a sexual harassment case in which each party presented a conflicting version of an event (and the vignettes themselves did not use these terms). Finally, while the terms "offender" and "victim" might involve a connotation of criminal liability, in the present context they equally apply to disciplinary and civil proceedings.

offender) remains anonymous. Furthermore, anonymity can be complete or incomplete; glimpses and hints of identity can be provided, for example, in the form of the initials of the person's name, a photo taken from behind, or a pixelated image. Likewise, identification is a matter of degree and can include only the person's first name or also the surname, a clear photo of his or her face, bibliographical information, and so on.

This state of affairs raises the question of whether anonymity or identification *matters*. Is our evaluation of an event influenced by whether the people depicted in it are anonymous or identified? Specifically, in the context of sexual misconduct, does this factor affect our judgments about the credibility, blame, and morality of the accuser and the accused, or whether sexual harassment in fact occurred? To the extent that such judgments are indeed influenced by whether the individuals involved are anonymous or not, this phenomenon bears potential social and legal implications. For example, if even minimal identification—say, by first name alone—increases or decreases a person's credibility or blameworthiness in the eyes of others, this, in turn, might affect the willingness of victims (most of whom are 'ordinary' people rather than celebrities) to complain about sexual harassment, as well as the treatment they will receive in their surroundings. The importance of this inquiry is augmented by the fact that allegations of sexual harassment are often dealt with in the public arena (Wexler, Robbennolt, and Murphy 2018) and do not necessarily culminate with a decision by a court or a disciplinary board.

Given that anonymity or identification is an inherent, prominent feature of any report on sexual harassment, it is surprising that this issue has not been examined yet through the lens of the psychological phenomenon labelled the *identifiability effect*. The identifiability effect is the tendency of people to react more strongly to identified individuals than to unidentified ones. It was found, for example, that victims of natural disasters or individuals who are gravely ill usually attract more generous donations from the public when they are identified by name and/or a photo, rather than anonymous (Kogut and Ritov 2005b; Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic 2007). In this study, we address the gap in the literature and test the existence and characteristics of the identifiability effect in the socially important context of sexual harassment.[3]

Our study reports on the findings of three original experiments that examined people's judgments regarding a sexual harassment case using representative samples of Israeli society. We found that minimal and meaningless identification—by first name only—significantly impacted the parties to the event. Generally speaking, such identification benefitted the

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[3] For a general discussion of sexual harassment and the diverse legal and social issues involved, see, e.g., MacKinnon and Siegel 2004; Marshall 2005; LeMoncheck and Sterba 2001.

offender: Respondents viewed an identified wrongdoer (either male or female) as more credible and moral, and less blameworthy and responsible for the event (relative to the victim), than an unidentified wrongdoer. Furthermore, when the offender was identified, respondents were less inclined to regard the situation as one that involves sexual harassment. In contrast, identification was much less beneficial for the victim, and under certain circumstances could even worsen her or his position. In particular, a female victim fared worse when she identified actively by stating her willingness to disclose her name publicly (rather than preferring that her name not be revealed in public; hereinafter 'passive identification'). Active identification resulted in a perception of less credibility and morality, more blameworthiness and responsibility for the event, less determinations that sexual harassment had in fact occurred, and less support for taking measures against the offender. We examined various explanations for this disparate effect of identification on offenders and victims, including respondents' gender, their emotional reactions, and sexism.[4] Briefly, we find that the difference between active and passive identification reverses for male victims (with passively identified males faring worse than active ones) and is moderated by sexism.

These findings bear potentially important and timely policy implications. The rise of the #MeToo movement has focused public attention on the problem of sexual harassment like never before. Many feel that the moment for social change has finally arrived (Schultz 2018; Wexler, Robbennolt, and Murphy 2018).[5] Our study focuses on the effects of anonymity and identification on the judgments of the public (rather than the judgments of investigative and adjudicative professionals, to whom both parties are typically identified), as these reactions influence the willingness of victims to complain in the first place. It is well known that the risk of being judged negatively in one's own surroundings or in the press and social media can deter potential complainants from breaking their silence (Dodd et al. 2001, 569; Brake 2005, 25–42). Among other concerns, victims of sexual misconduct fear not being believed, being blamed or shamed, and receiving retaliation (Beiner 2001, 312–23; Hébert 2007, 731–42). Yet our findings point to another serious source of apprehension; namely, that *the mere fact of identification*—in and of itself and independent of the content of each parties' version of the event—might work to the benefit of the offender and the detriment of the victim. In

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[4] We also examined a series of additional proposed mediators, including political affiliation, religious affiliation, age, social norms perceptions, fears related to sexual harassment, and stereotypical perceptions regarding the characteristics of the offender and the victim. For the sake of brevity, and since none of these factors moderated the effect, we report these analyses in the Appendix.

[5] In Israel, for example, in March 2018 the President of the Supreme Court, Esther Hayut, formed a committee to examine and change the ways in which the legal system treats victims of sexual offenses. See https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/law/.premium-1.6051682/ (in Hebrew).

general, this study elucidates the complexity of judgments on sexual harassment, and has normative implications for the appropriate balance between publicity and anonymity in various contexts relevant to sexual harassment, including social networks, the media, and disciplinary and judicial tribunals.

The Article is structured as follows. In Part II, we provide the theoretical background by describing the existing literature on the identifiability effect and its shortcomings, as well as explaining the motivation and likely contribution of our study. In Part III we present our experiments and detail their findings. Following that, we dedicate Part IV to discussing the results. There, we compare our findings to current knowledge about the identifiability effect, highlight their normative implications, recognize their limitations, and indicate possible directions for future research.

II. Theoretical Background

The main line of existing research on the identifiability effect has examined pro-social behavior, such as monetary donations. Studies found that people are significantly more willing to help another person and contribute more money when the individual in need is identified rather than unidentified (Jenni and Loewenstein 1997; Kogut and Ritov 2005a, 2005b; Ritov and Kogut 2011; Slovic et al. 2013). Importantly, identifiability can have such an effect even when it conveys no meaningful or individuating information about the recipient (see, e.g., Burnham 2003 [identification by photograph]; Charness and Gneezy 2008 [identification by name)]; Small and Loewenstein 2003 [identification by number]). Knowing a person's name, for example, does not really make them more familiar or deserving of help than an unnamed person (Kogut and Ritov 2010, 134)—and yet merely knowing the beneficiary's name is enough to induce people to allocate more money to him/her, even at the contributors' own expense (Charness and Gneezy 2008, 32). To date, the identifiability effect has been observed mainly with regard to human beings, although one study found this effect in relation to endangered animals (Markowitz et al. 2013).

Another line of experimental research explored the effect of identifiability on reactions to blameworthy behavior. Thus far, however, only very few studies have tested the effect of identifying wrongdoers, with mixed results. Kogut (2011) showed that when an individual is seen as responsible for his own plight—in the case of a person who contracted AIDS as a result of drug use—identification (by name and photo) leads to a decrease in willingness to help him finance expensive medication. Similarly, Small and Loewenstein (2005) observed that identification by number alone can lead to an increased monetary penalty for non-cooperators in a social-dilemma laboratory game. In contrast, an initial study by Lewinsohn-

Zamir, Ritov, and Kogut (2017) of the identifiability effect in legal settings found that identification benefitted the identified wrongdoer. Specifically, that study examined the choices made by participants with regard to the appropriate legal remedies and fines in two types of lawmaking—comparing the judgments they made as policymakers formulating rules for unidentified people, with their judgments as decision-makers concerning identified individuals. The data revealed that participants were more lenient toward wrongdoers when responding in their capacity as decision-makers than when acting as policymakers. In sum, depending on the specific context, minimal identification causes people to react either more generously or more punitively towards others (for a recent meta-analysis of the literature on the identifiability effect see Lee and Feeley 2016).[6]

The literature suggests that the chief source of the identifiability effect is the stronger emotional reactions elicited by an identified individual. In the context of helping behavior, emphatic emotions—such as sympathy, compassion and distress at the plight of another—are preconditioned on adopting the other person's perspective and imagining how he or she feels. This is more likely to occur when an individual is identified rather than anonymous. Similarly, researchers suggested that when certain blameworthy behavior is involved, people find it easier to attribute responsibility or feel anger toward an identified person than toward abstract individuals (Kogut and Ritov, 2005a, 2010; Markowitz et al. 2013). Additional, complementary explanations for the effect of identifiability on pro-social behavior emphasize the importance of people's perceptions of their own role in the situation, and particularly their tendency to feel more responsible and effective when they decide to help a particular identified individual than an anonymous person or a group (Jenni and Loewenstein 1997; Cryder and Loewenstein 2012; Cryder, Loewenstein, and Scheines 2013).

By exploring the effect of identification in sexual harassment cases, this study contributes not only to the literature on sexual harassment, but also more generally to the literature on the identifiability effect. First, our examination promotes understanding of factors that affect people's judgments on this issue, which can assist us in devising the ways to deal with this social problem. Second, the diverse features of sexual harassment scenarios highlight factors that were not examined yet in psychological studies of the identifiability effect. These factors

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[6] Psychological studies have further shown that at least under certain circumstances, the identifiability effect occurs only with regard to a single identified person and does not extend to a group of identified people (Kogut and Ritov 2005a, 2005b). Some studies have found that even the smallest possible group, comprised of two identified members, invoked less willingness to assist than a single identified recipient (Markowitz et al. 2013; Slovic et al. 2013). This phenomenon has been named the *singularity effect*. Note, however, that a few experimental studies have observed an identifiability effect in scenarios involving groups (Nordgren and Morris McDonnell 2011; Ritov and Zamir 2014).

are likely to be relevant for additional contexts, and thus point to promising avenues for future research.

Generally speaking, most experiments on the identifiability effect have concentrated on situations which share the following features: First, they explored 'positive' contexts, i.e., situations in which participants were asked to help someone in need, who was either identified or unidentified (see, e.g., Kogut and Ritov 2005b [donations to cancer patients]; Kogut and Ritov 2007 [aid to tsunami victims]; and Slovic et al. 2013 [donations to starving children]). Of the few studies investigating the identifiability effect in 'negative' contexts involving blameworthy behavior, one (Kogut 2011) actually examined pro-social behavior, since it tested whether the fact that a person is causally responsible for his illness (a drug addict who contracted HIV from an infected needle) affects people's willingness to help him. Although Lewinsohn-Zamir, Ritov and Kogut (2017) explored wrongdoing in the sphere of legal remedies and sanctions, the vignettes in that study depicted transgressions that are comparatively mild and do not involve moral turpitude, such as breaching a commercial contract so as to mitigate losses or littering in a public park. Finally, Small and Lowenstein's (2005) finding that identifiability increased willingness to penalize may have been influenced by the fact that the blameworthy behavior—non-cooperation in a laboratory game—adversely affected the participants themselves (who were then given the opportunity to inflict a monetary penalty on former non-cooperators). In sum, the limited and mixed data regarding the effect of identification on wrongdoers calls for further experimentation. The issue of sexual harassment provides a useful testing case for investigating the effect of identification on blameworthy behavior.

Second, experiments to date on the identifiability effect have tested situations in which no factual ambiguity existed. Typically, participants are informed about the facts of the case and then asked to reach a decision. For instance, in donation scenarios, the fact that the recipient suffers from a life-threating illness necessitating financial assistance was never contested. Furthermore, the situations commonly tested in the literature did not require participants to form judgments regarding a conflict between individuals, identified or not. Thus, for example, the vignettes used by Gino, Shu, and Bazerman (2010), which examined forms of unethicality (primarily related to professional misconduct by doctors and real-estate agents), clearly conveyed that unethical behavior had occurred and there were no disputed facts between the parties. In real life, and particularly in situations involving conflicts between individuals, the facts and their interpretation are often disputed. Indeed, in sexual harassment cases, each party usually presents a conflicting version of an event.

Third, studies on the identifiability effect typically identify only one of the parties. Although some psychological studies examined the effect of identifying a group of victims (see Ritov and Kogut 2005a, 2005b, in the context of monetary donations), they have not compared the effect of identifying opposing parties simultaneously. Even in the rare case that both parties to an event were identified (see Lewinsohn-Zamir et al. 2017), participants were only asked to evaluate the wrongdoer and were not asked to compare the wrongdoer and the injured party. Yet real-life conflicts often involve identified victims *and* identified offenders. Sexual harassment conflicts in particular increasingly evolve from asymmetric identification (where only one party—typically the offender—is identified) to symmetric identification of both parties, as more victims—especially following the #MeToo movement—forgo their anonymity and 'come out' to the public. It is commonly assumed that this move towards identification would improve the condition of high- and low-profile victims alike.[7] This assumption, however, needs to be tested. In symmetric identification settings, it is possible that only one individual or both would incur an identification 'premium,' or that symmetric identification would offset the premium of each individual, thus resembling a situation in which none of the parties was identified. By examining the effect of identification in the common situations where factual ambiguity exists and the contesting parties are both identified, this study aims to contribute to the debate about the ways to address sexual harassment.

In testing the effect of identifiability on judgments relating to the victim and to the offender, we introduce a new distinction between two types of identification: *passive identification*, whereby the identified victim requests that her/his name not be publicly revealed, and *active identification*, whereby the identified victim expresses willingness to disclose her/his name in public. Cases of sexual (and other forms of) misconduct often involve this distinction, as some complainants are willing to step forward only if their anonymity vis-à-vis the public is preserved, while others decide to publicly identify themselves. For this reason, the Equal Employment Opportunity Committee urged employers to provide confidentiality to complainants and allow employees "to discuss questions or

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[7] For example, the *Time* magazine Person of the Year 2017 issue mentioned above stated that "[e]mboldened by Judd, Rose McGowan and other prominent accusers, women everywhere have begun to speak out about the inappropriate, abusive and in some cases illegal behavior they've faced. When multiple harassment claims bring down a charmer like former *Today* show host Matt Lauer, women who thought they had no recourse see a new, wide-open door. When a movie star says #MeToo, it becomes easier to believe the cook who's been quietly enduring for years" (id., 25). Similarly, in a TIME/SurveyMonkey online poll conducted in November 2017, 82% of the respondents said that "women are more likely to speak out about harassment since the Weinstein allegations" (id., 42).

concerns about harassment on an anonymous basis." (EEOC 1999). Nevertheless, complainants who are willing to identify in public are commonly considered more credible than those who prefer to remain anonymous. As one commentator wrote in the context of whistleblowers, "the unwillingness of anonymous complainants to identify themselves may have undermined their credibility in some eyes" (Westman 2005, 149). Indeed, for many complainants, anonymity presents a trade-off between credibility and protection from reprisal. Hence, all other things being equal, active identification—that is, willingness to disclose one's identity publicly—should make a complaint more credible.

However, some studies suggest that women in particular can be penalized for agentic behavior (Rudman 1998; Rudman and Glick 1999). Female agency can decrease women's likeability (Rudman 1998; Rudman and Glick 1999; Dodd et al. 2001), and assertive rather than tentative speech reduces the persuasiveness of female speakers (Carli 1990). These findings suggest that actively identified female victims in sexual harassment cases may be perceived as acting against gender roles, as compared to unidentified or passively identified female victims—or to male victims. Consequently, actively identified female victims might pay the price of reduced persuasiveness and likeability. This hypothesis is particularly disturbing given the complex social pressures that already cause women to keep silent about sexual harassment and violence, including fears regarding retaliation, blame, and shame (Fitzgerald, Swan and Fischer 1995; Ahrens 2006).

In light of these two conflicting hypotheses regarding the impact of active identification in sexual harassment cases and their possible relation to gender, it is also important to address the potential role of gendered perceptions. In the context of rape and other sexual offenses, various studies have found that people's judgments on these issues are influenced by gender stereotypes relating to the victim's sex, race, sexual orientation, age, physical attractiveness, dress, respectability, social status, alcohol consumption, and other factors (Cameron and Stritzke 2003; Corr and Jackson 2001; Donavan 2007; Landström, Strömwall and Alfredsson 2016; McCaul et al. 1990; Sleath and Bull 2017; van der Bruggen and Grubb 2014; Vrij and Firmin 2001). Thus, for example, a respectable occupation, conservative dress, and physical attractiveness can reduce blame attribution to female victims; whereas alcohol consumption, flirtatious behavior, or being an African-American might raise such attribution. Although this literature did not investigate the role of identifiability, it raises the possibility that gender stereotypes may also affect the evaluation of sexual harassment victims in different modes of identification.

More generally, social attitudes towards women have shifted over the years from overt and blatant sexism to more covert and subtle forms of sexism. In the past, studies found

explicit support for unequal treatment of women, for example in the belief that women should not expect to have the same rights as men (Spence et al. 1973); or that women are not as smart as men or not as capable of logic (Swim et al. 1995). In recent decades, the prevalence of 'old sexism' declined, and subtler and more implicit forms of sexism were discovered. The Modern Sexism scale (MS) measures "whether respondents tend to (a) deny the existence of discrimination towards women, (b) resent complaints about discrimination, and (c) resent special 'favors' for women," such as programs that are meant to help women overcome workplace barriers (Swim and Cohen 1997, 105). People scoring high on MS are not necessarily chauvinists; they may lack information, awareness, or understanding of gender discrimination. MS has been related to preferences for male over female political leaders, overestimation of the percentage of women in male-dominated fields, beliefs that the gender-segregated workforce is a result of biological differences and not socialization and discrimination, unfavorable attitudes towards affirmative action, and the conception that gender discrimination no longer exists (Swim et al. 1995). Modern sexism may explain any negative effect of active identification on female victims. Therefore, our study will also examine the relation of factors like gender roles and sexism to the identifiability effect in sexual harassment cases.

III. Experimental Findings

This Part describes three experiments on the effect of identification and anonymity on people's judgements regarding sexual harassment. In designing the experiments, our general hypothesis was that the identifiability effect is a broad phenomenon that will manifest itself in people's judgments regarding sexual harassment. More specifically, we predicted in Experiment 1 that asymmetric identification (of only the victim) would benefit the victim, as identified victims typically generate more empathy and support than unidentified ones. We had no definite prediction as to whether asymmetric identification (of only the offender) would be advantageous for the offender. We suspected, however, that the penalty for an identified wrongdoer observed in a few studies might not manifest itself in our context. First, because Lewinsohn-Zamir et al. (2017) found in certain legal contexts that identified wrongdoers benefit from identification. Second, because the factual contestation characterizing sexual harassment disputes (often of the "his/her words against mine" kind) could evoke empathy towards the alleged offender. In addition, factors like sexism may be more influential in the sexual harassment context than in the situations that psychologists commonly examine (like charitable donations), and consequently influence people's

judgements on this issue. For the sake of convenience and clarity, we state our hypotheses regarding Experiments 2 and 3 when describing these experiments below.

A. Experiment 1: Asymmetric Identification

Participants. A power analysis indicated that we would need to recruit a sample of approximately 650 participants in order to have 80% power to detect the hypothesized effect, assuming an approximate effect size (Cohen's d) of 0.25, on the basis of a pilot study we conducted with university students. A representative sample of 657 Israeli adults (50% women, M_{age} = 42 years old, SD=15.1 years) was recruited to participate in an online study through "Midgam" survey company, in keeping with the Israeli census age and gender quotas. The company provided demographic data on the participants, including their age, gender, marital and familial status, religious affiliation, education, and income. Note that Experiment 1 was launched before the rise of the #MeToo movement.

Procedure. We employed a between-subject experimental design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: None-Identified (Control), Identified Offender, and Identified Victim. In each of the conditions, participants read the scenario below, depicting a sexual harassment complaint submitted by a female employee against her male manager. In the Control version of the scenario, the manager and the employee were not identified by their name, and the event read as follows:

> Imagine the following scenario:
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> The official in charge of sexual harassment complaints at a workplace received a complaint from an employee about one of the managers at the organization.[8]
>
> The employee told the official that during the organization's annual party, the manager approached her and asked her to come with him to his office. The employee said that in the office they both had a few drinks, chatted about work-related issues, and joked about the party's artistic program. She then said that the manager complimented her on her outfit, stroked her back, and asked her if she would like to meet him after work hours. The manager then tried to kiss her and she recoiled. The employee added that she and the manager have been working together on a daily basis for a long period, with mutual respect and appreciation. For this reason, she was particularly hurt by his behavior.
>
> The manager denied the employee's story. He said that no employee had ever previously accused him of this kind of behavior. In addition, the manager told the official that his conversation with the employee in his office was merely a friendly one, that he never touched her in a sexual way, and that the employee must have misinterpreted his intentions due to the alcohol she had consumed.

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[8] In Hebrew, the words "employee" and "manager" are gendered, with different female and male forms. We used the female form for "employee" and the male form for "manager" throughout this scenario.

> One of the other employees at the same workplace said in a private conversation that
> he believed the complaint to be false, resulting from a rift between the employee and
> the manager that made the employee fear for her job. He added that "support for this
> employee undermines the struggle of women and men against real sexual harassment."
> In contrast, another employee stated in the same conversation that to the best of his
> knowledge, there was no rift between the manager and the employee.

In the Identified Offender condition, the manager was identified as David in the first sentence (as in, "David, one of the managers"), and all further references to "the manager" were replaced with the name "David." In contrast, the employee was not identified by name and was referred to as the "employee" (as in the Control version). Similarly, in the Identified Victim condition, the employee was identified as Rachel in the first sentence (as in, "an employee, Rachel") and all further references to "the employee" were replaced with "Rachel". The manager was not identified by name and was always referred to as the "manager." The employee/Rachel and the manager/David were mentioned roughly the same number of times in the scenario (eleven and ten times, respectively).[9]

Outcome measures. Following previous studies of judgments of sexual misconduct cases (Vrij and Firmin 2001, 250; Cameron and Stritzke 2003, 1008), participants were asked to evaluate the employee and the manager on scales of 1 (*Not at all*) to 7 (*Absolutely*), regarding their credibility ("to what extent do you believe X?"), responsibility for the event ("to what extent did X's behavior lead to the event?"), blameworthiness ("to what extent is X to blame for the event?"), and morality ("to what extent was X's behavior moral?"). The different judgments tracked the multifaceted nature of evaluations of sexual harassment claims on the part of the public and legal decision-makers, which typically address questions of both credibility and blameworthiness. For example, people may view the offender/victim as credible, but nevertheless responsible and blameworthy for the events described; others might disagree about the moral weight that should be attached to the behavior. The order of employee/manager presentation within each measure was counterbalanced between subjects. Negative evaluations (blame and responsibility) were reverse-coded in the analysis to align with the positive evaluations (credibility and morality). Finally, participants were asked to determine whether to their judgment, the scenario described the occurrence of sexual harassment (a binary yes/no question).

Mediators. Given the mediating role of emotions on the identifiability effect (Kogut and Ritov 2005a; Lewinsohn-Zamir, Kogut, and Ritov 2017) and in shaping moral judgments

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[9] We chose the names "Rachel" and "David" because they are common among the Jewish population in Israel (Sephardic and Ashkenazi alike) and are not associated with any particular age or socio-economic status.

regarding crime in particular (Paternoster and Deise 2011), we asked participants to rate their feelings (of anger, empathy, and pity) towards the employee and the manager on a 1 to 7 scale, in a counterbalanced order. We also included an indicator of 'rape myth' acceptance (Burt 1980, 223), asking participants to estimate the percentage of rape or sexual harassment complaints that are fabricated (the possible answers were: most cases, 75% percent of cases, 50% of cases, 25% of cases, almost none).[10] The exact text of all questions, as translated by the authors from Hebrew to English, is provided in the Appendix.

For the sake of simplicity (as explained in note 2), our analysis of the results uses the terms "victim" and "offender" in a broad manner, referring to the person complaining about sexual harassment and the person accused of sexual harassment, respectively. These terms should not be understood as necessarily implying that the alleged victim had been harassed by the alleged offender. Indeed, the wording of the experimental vignettes presented conflicting versions of an event and used the neutral terms "employee," "manager," "Rachel," and "David."

Results. Our analytical strategy was guided by three considerations. First, we wanted to exploit the richness offered by our outcome measures without over-testing the data. Second, we were especially interested in victim-offender comparisons, given the adversarial nature of the legal process and the "his word against her word" nature of sexual harassment cases in particular. These characteristics require decision-makers to determine which party they favor, rendering the gap in the evaluations of the parties the key variable of interest. Thirdly, this analytical assumption was supported by a high and negative correlation between the victim evaluations and the offender evaluations ($r = -.45$, $p < .001$). Consequentially, we analyzed the data using a single general linear model (Between/Within-Subject ANOVA). The within-subject factor included the gaps between the victim (employee) and the offender (manager) on the four evaluations. The between-subject factor was the Identification condition. Statistically, this test is entirely equivalent to testing a single dependent variable that is the compound of all of the eight measures, but offers the additional advantage of perceiving differences between credibility, morality, responsibility, and blameworthiness.

Across condition groups, participants favored the victim over the offender, finding her more credible and moral and less blameworthy and responsible for the event than the offender. But, as Figure 1 below shows, identification—by first name only—significantly influenced participants' judgments of the event, on all four dimensions. The gap between the victim and the offender decreased significantly when the offender was identified

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[10] We report the analyses of additional potential mediators in the Appendix. None of these measures proved to be a significant mediator of the effects reported in this section.

($M_{Control}$=1.75, SD=1.07, $M_{ID\text{-}Offender}$=1.43, SD=1.06, $F_{(2,654)}$= 3.712, p=.025). Planned simple contrasts revealed that an identified offender generated more positive evaluations than an unidentified offender (contrast estimate = -.312, p=.049, 95% CI [-.622, -.002], d=.19), and more so when compared with an unidentified offender whose victim was identified (contrast estimate= -.415, p=.009, 95% CI [-.725, -.104], d=.26). In contrast, identifying the victim did not significantly increase the evaluation gap in her favor (as compared to an unidentified victim; contrast estimate= .103, p=.52, 95% CI [-.207, .413]).

Figure 1. The Impact of Identification on Victim-Offender Evaluations in Experiment 1

Note: The graph depicts the gaps in the victim-offender evaluations along the four dimensions (a higher gap = more positive victim evaluations). Identifying the offender significantly decreased the gap, yet identifying the victim did not have a significant effect in her favor.

To probe the effects further, we conducted separate analyses of the victim and offender evaluations. We found that identifying the offender both raised his evaluations by .164 points (contrast estimate), p=.05 95% CI [0.01, .33], and lowered the (unidentified) victim evaluations by -.148 points (contrast estimate), p=.15 (not significant). These effects reinforced each other to produce the overall effect on the victim-offender evaluation gap. In contrast, identifying the victim had no significant effect on victim evaluations (p = .4) or on the (unidentified) offender evaluations (p = .83). For example, identifying the victim did not reduce the credibility of the offender (M=3.35) versus the control (M=3.3); nor did it raise her

own credibility (M=4.59) versus that of the control (M=4.63).[11] This lack of effect does not seem to imply a ceiling effect. Although the victim was evaluated more favorably than the offender, her mean evaluations were ~4.5 on a scale of 1–7, as Table 1 shows.

Table 1. Means of Victim and Offender Evaluations on a 7-Point Scale

	Credibility (M,SD)	Morality	Blameworthiness	Responsibility	Overall Mean (B, R reversed)
Victim	4.54 (1.09)	4.16 (1.44)	3.1 (1.52)	3.56 (1.44)	4.51 (1.06)
Offender	3.36 (1.12)	2.28 (1.26)	5.19 (1.22)	5.14 (1.13)	2.83 (.89)

The positive effect of identification on the offender—but not on the victim—was also revealed in participants' binary judgments about whether sexual harassment had in fact occurred. A chi-square test showed that participants were less likely to think that sexual harassment had occurred when the offender was identified (only 65.6%) than they were when either both parties remained *unidentified* in the control condition (77%, Z=2.7, p = .007) or in the identified victim condition (72%; the difference between the control and the identified victim conditions was not significant, p=.215; overall test: χ^2= 7.4, p = .025).

We examined several potential moderators and mediators of the identifiability effect. As expected, gender significantly affected judgments in general, as women respondents were significantly more likely than men to believe that sexual harassment had occurred and to evaluate the victim more positively and the offender more negatively ($F_{(1,650)}$ = 38.82, p < .001). However, men and women did *not* differ significantly in their tendency to treat an identified offender more favorably, and identification did not interact with gender (p = .429). Indeed, the overall effect of identifiability and the beneficial impact of identification for the offender remained significant with gender in the model ($F_{(1,650)}$= 4.25, p = .015).

With respect to emotions, we computed an emotions gap scale by subtracting the average emotional response to the offender from that expressed towards the victim; anger was reverse coded. The higher the computed average, the more overall positive the emotions evoked by

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[11] For the sake of caution, we tested the effect of identification on each of the victim's measures; none was significant within the 5% level. One measure—blameworthiness—showed borderline significance with p=.06, in that the identified victim was considered slightly less blameworthy than the unidentified one. Given that all other results were null, we consider this close to significant result a spurious finding.

the victim relative to the offender. For the purpose of the mediation analysis, we created a composite dependent variable from the average of the credibility, responsibility, blame, and morality gaps (Cronbach alpha = .843). Applying the Hayes PROCESS mediation procedure for multi-categorical independent variables (Model 4), we found that the identified offender 'premium' was partially mediated by the evoked emotions. Identification decreased the emotional gap between the victim and the offender, such that there was a significant indirect effect of the *identified offender* (as contrasted with the control group) on the evaluations gap through the emotions gap, a*b= -.139, BCa CI [-.269, -.021]. The mediator could account for roughly 60% of the total effect, P_m=.57. This result suggests that one of the sources of the victim-offender evaluations gap is the more positive emotional reaction evoked by an identified wrongdoer. In contrast, identifying the victim did not significantly affect the emotional reaction towards her.

Belief in rape myths (i.e., that most reports on rape and sexual harassment are fabricated by women) mediated a small part (11%) of the total effect of the contrast between the *identified victim* and the control conditions, which was significant in this analysis (a*b = -.027, BCa CI [-.062, -.003]). The analysis revealed an inconsistent mediation relationship, as identifying the victim *increased* participants' belief in complaints-fabrication, which in turn decreased the evaluation gap between the victim and the offender. These beliefs did not mediate the identified offender effect.

Discussion. Experiment 1 tested the effect of identifying the victim and the offender on judgments about sexual harassment. The results indicate that even minimal identification confers a 'premium' on the offender, by raising the offender's perceived credibility and morality and reducing his blame and responsibility for the event, relative to the victim's. Furthermore, identifying the offender also reduced the percentage of participants who believed that sexual harassment had occurred.

In contrast, we did not find the classic, favorable 'identified victim' effect in this setting. The victim did not benefit from being identified; moreover, identifying the victim actually increased the average belief in the fabrication of sexual violence complaints (the rape myth belief) and thus reduced her overall evaluations in a mediation analysis. Participants were also somewhat less likely to think that sexual harassment had occurred when the victim was identified (compared with the control group and the identified offender group; though this result was not statistically significant). Participants' gender did not interact with identification. Notably, effect sizes were the common small-medium effects found in psychological experiments, as expected in our power analysis (see, e.g., Tankard and Paluck 2017).

These results appear somewhat paradoxical in light of the 'identified victim' literature. Our scenario featured an alleged offender and an alleged victim, and only the offender benefited from becoming identified. From a psychological perspective, the benefit to the offender was more expected, in light of the findings of Lewinsohn-Zamir et al. (2017) that identification in certain legal settings can benefit wrongdoers and given the existence of a factual dispute, which could cast the alleged offender as a victim in some eyes. Knowing the offender's name makes him more relatable and a likelier object for compassion. Indeed, we found that the identified offender evoked more favorable emotions than an unidentified offender and that this result partially mediated the identifiability effect.

Alongside these findings, it remains unclear why identification did not significantly influence the emotional response to the identified victim. More generally, it is puzzling that identification did not raise the victim's evaluations yet did increase the belief that sexual violence claims are fabricated. Observing the victim and the offender separately indicated that participants viewed the offender as relatively credible (hence the generally small credibility gap), yet found him less moral and more blameworthy nevertheless. However, the 'offender premium' was consistent along the four evaluations, as was the null effect for the victim. Jointly, the findings suggest that identifying the victim does not benefit the victim and that it might even be harmful.

One potential concern regarding the results is that they might have been influenced by the relative scarcity of real-life reports on sexual harassment where the victim is identified and the offender is anonymous. More commonly, especially following the #MeToo movement, victims become identified in a symmetric context that also identifies the offender. Perhaps our failure to find a 'victim premium' results from the unlikely identification setting of Experiment 1. To overcome this limitation, Experiment 2 tests the effect of victim identification by adding it to a context that includes an identified offender (symmetric identification) and comparing it to the typical asymmetrical (only offender identified) and no identification contexts. This comparison also provides an opportunity to replicate the identified offender effect of Experiment 1. In addition, Experiment 2 examines the association between identification and agency. As explained above, a victim can actively choose to become identified to the public or attempt to remain anonymous. Choosing to identify publicly can signal credibility, confidence, and strength, yet it can also be detrimental for women, who are commonly penalized for assertive behavior. To further explore the influence of identification on victims of sexual harassment, Experiment 2 compares the effects of active, passive, and neutral identification.

B. Experiment 2: Asymmetric versus Symmetric, Active versus Passive Identification

The first goal of the second experiment was to compare between asymmetric identification and symmetric identification. As discussed above, sexual harassment disputes increasingly involve two publicly-identified parties, instead of the typical identified offender and anonymous-to-the-public victim. In symmetrical settings, either both individuals or only one of them could incur an identification 'premium' (especially considering the findings of Experiment 1). Symmetric identification may also offset the offender's premium and consequently resemble a situation in which none of the parties is identified.

A second and more nuanced goal of Experiment 2 was to examine whether the level of agency associated with identification moderates the identifiability effect, and particularly whether actively identified victims are awarded a premium or suffer a penalty. If victims' agentic relation to identification influences their evaluations (for better or for worse), this factor may explain the evaluation of identified victims more generally. Specifically, public perceptions might have come to associate victim identification with either reliability or 'pushiness.' To test this hypothesis, we created a comparison between neutral, passive, and active symmetric identification, allowing us to observe any passive/active effect as well as any similarity between neutral symmetric identification and one of its agentic states.

Finally, Experiment 2 aimed to explore additional sources of the identifiability effect. Primarily, we expanded the measurement of emotions to examine whether participants' own distress and fears regarding sexual harassment—including their fear of being falsely accused of sexual harassment—mediate their assessments of the victim and the offender.[12] Our two hypotheses were the following:

H2a: Symmetric identification differs from asymmetric identification.

H2b: Active identification differs from passive identification.

Given the multiple directions of a potential effect, these hypotheses are not directional.

Participants. Based on Experiment 1, a power analysis indicated that we would need to recruit a sample of approximately 1,261 participants to have 80% power to detect the hypothesized effect, assuming an approximate effect size (Cohen's d) of 0.25.[13] Using the same methods, we recruited a new representative sample of 1,274 participants (50% women, M_{age}= 43 years old, SD = 15.6 years). Participants in Experiment 1 were excluded from participation in Experiment 2. Between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, the *#MeToo*

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[12] We also measured participants' perceptions of existing and directional social norms regarding sexual harassment and report these measures and their analysis in the Appendix. None of these measures proved to be a significant mediator of the effects reported in this section.

[13] We registered our study in AsPredicted.org (#7050) prior to running the experiment.

campaign had been launched, so participants in Experiment 2 were probably exposed to this campaign and to the discourse on the prevalence of sexual harassment that followed it; this did not appear to influence our results.

Procedure. We employed a between-subject design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of five conditions: no identification (control), identification of the offender alone, and three types of symmetric identification (both parties identified): neutral, active and passive. In each condition, participants read a variant of the scenario of Experiment 1. The control and the identified offender conditions were identical to Experiment 1. In the neutral symmetric identification condition, the employee and the manager were both identified throughout the scenario by their first name—"Rachel" and "David," respectively. In the additional two symmetric conditions, a single sentence was added to the vignette (see below in square brackets), to convey Rachel's relation to her identification—active or passive. The active type of identification appears in bold and the passive type in italics. Thus, the first paragraph of the three symmetric identification conditions read as follows:

> The official in charge of sexual harassment complaints at a workplace received a complaint from an employee, Rachel, about David, one of the managers at the organization. [Rachel submitted the complaint to the official with her name on it, **and noted that she was willing to have her identity revealed in public** /*but requested that her identity would not be revealed in public*].

The remainder of the text was identical to that of the neutral symmetric identification condition. Notably, we opted for a very mild form of active identification and were careful not to frame it as desired or outgoing. The victim did not personally publicize her complaint, nor did she identify herself in the social media or interview for a newspaper. She merely indicated her willingness to have her identity publicly revealed.

Outcome measures. After reading the scenario, participants were asked—as in Experiment 1—to rate the credibility, responsibility for the event, blameworthiness, and morality of the victim and the offender. In Experiment 2, we also examined participants' support for taking measures against the offender. Participants were asked to rate the appropriateness of several potential outcomes (including no consequences for either party, an apology to the victim, disciplinary action against the offender, dismissing the offender, and filing criminal charges against the offender, among others), on a scale ranging from 1 (*Not appropriate at all*) to 7 (*Very appropriate*). The full list is included in the Appendix.

Mediators. Following Lewinsohn-Zamir et al. (2017), we added a fourth emotion—identification with the victim/offender—to our scale. We also measured participants' fears of becoming a victim of sexual harassment and of being falsely accused of sexual harassment on

a scale from 1 (*Not at all*) to 7 (*Very much*). We report the analysis of additional potential mediators in the Appendix.

   Results. As in Experiment 1, the data was analyzed using a general linear model (Between/Within-Subject ANOVA) with the four evaluation gap composites—credibility, responsibility for the event (reversed), blameworthiness (reversed), and morality—as the within-subject factor, and the identification condition as the between-subject factor.[14] Identification significantly influenced participants' relative evaluations of the victim and the offender ($F_{(4,1269)}$ = 3.84, *p* = .004). First, we replicated the identified offender effect. Compared with the control, where none of the parties was identified, identifying the offender reduced the victim-offender evaluation gap by -.403 scale points (contrast estimate, 95% CI [-.727, -.08]; *p* = .015, d=.22).

   Intriguingly, moving from asymmetric to symmetric identification did not change this effect. Neutrally identifying both the victim and the offender was roughly equivalent to identifying *only* the offender. The offender retained his identifiability premium when the victim was also identified, but the identified victim did not obtain a similar premium. As compared with the control (neither party is identified), the evaluation gap shrank by -.437 scale points (contrast estimate, 95% CI [-.761, -.114]; *p* = .008, d=.25; see below Figure 2, left panel).

   Examining the impact of the mode of identification was illuminating. Active identification by the victim was roughly identical to neutral identification (control/active contrast estimate = -.473, 95% CI [-.793,-.154], *p* = .004, d=.25), suggesting that without further information on the source of identification, participants treat neutral victim identification as though it was active. In contrast, passive identification of the victim was no different than no identification (control) (*p* = .746) and significantly different than active identification (*p* = .01). In other words, although the victim did not obtain an identifiability premium in the passive identification condition as compared with being unidentified, this was the only identified state in which the offender's identifiability premium was offset (see below Figure 2, right panel). However, this result cannot be attributed to a rise in the victim-evaluations in the passive condition, as an ANOVA of only the victim evaluations indicated that identification had no significant impact on these evaluations ($F_{(4,1269)}$=1.28, *p*=.277). The

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[14] This analysis is entirely identical to analyzing the average of all outcome measures. See above our explanation in Experiment 1 for the focus on the victim-offender gaps. Likewise in Experiment 2, the correlation between the victim average and the offender average was again high and negative, *r*= -.53, *p*<.001.

effect of identification came primarily from the change in the offender's evaluations, as an ANOVA focusing only on the offender evaluations revealed ($F_{(4,1269)}$=6.27, $p<.001$).

The same pattern of results was revealed in the binary sexual harassment judgments. The control-unidentified condition and the passive identification condition did not differ from each other, with 76% of the participants assigned to these conditions determining that sexual harassment had occurred. In contrast, in the neutral and active identification conditions, roughly 68% of the participants made such a determination, and in the asymmetric identified offender condition 70.8% of the participants determined that sexual harassment had occurred. In short, identification, specifically when the victim actively identified, raised the odds that participants would determine that sexual harassment had *not* occurred in the case (Active Identification: OR=1.5, 95% CI [1.02, 2.21], *p*=.04, Neutral Identification: OR=1.45, 95% CI [.98, 2.15], *p*=.06). These odds were also higher for male participants (OR=1.82, 95% CI [1.42, 2.33]).

Figure 2. Identification and the Victim-Offender Evaluation Gap in Experiment 2

Note: Results for the two main hypotheses of Experiment 2 are presented separately, with the neutral identification group repeated in both panels. The left panel shows the mean victim-offender gaps in credibility, responsibility, morality, and blameworthiness, as a function of no identification versus asymmetric (*p*=.015) and neutral symmetric identification (*p*=.008). The right panel shows the same as a function of the mode of symmetric identification: neutral and active identification (not significantly different) versus passive identification (*p* = .01). In

both panels, the height of each gap reflects the extent to which the victim was evaluated more positively than the offender. The overall test was $F_{(4,1269)} = 3.84$, $p = .004$.

Another noteworthy result was the effect of identification on participants' opinions regarding the appropriate outcome of the conflict (Figure 3).[15] Identifying the offender significantly lowered participants' support for taking measures against the offender ($F_{(4,1269)}=4.69$, $p=.001$)—from monetary compensation to criminal charges—with the exception of an apology, which was generally considered to be the most appropriate measure, regardless of condition. The next most appropriate measures, as rated, were disciplinary charges, transferring the offender to another position or department within the firm, withholding promotion, and monetary damages. Participants rated as least appropriate the dismissal of the offender, criminal charges, transferring the victim within the firm, and finally that the complaint would have no consequences whatsoever. Once again, the only condition in which victim identification did not reduce support in remedying the complaint was the passive symmetric identification condition.

Figure 3. The Impact of Identification on Support for Taking Measures Against the Offender in Experiment 2

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
[15] For the purposes of the analysis, the two anti-victim outcomes (no consequences and transferring the victim to another position or department within the firm) were reverse-coded.

Note: The figure portrays the mean support for taking the following measures against the offender (from most to least supported): requiring an apology, disciplinary proceedings, transferring the offender within the firm, delaying his promotion, ordering the payment of compensation, dismissing the offender, and pressing criminal charges. Ratings are shown as a function of Identification condition. $F_{(4, 1269)}=4.69$, $p = .001$.

As in Experiment 1, participants' gender emerged as a strong predictor of the victim-offender evaluations gap ($F_{(1,1264)}=56.87$, $p<.001$). The gap in women's evaluations was significantly larger than the men's gap, and this difference was highly pronounced with respect to the credibility gap, which was particularly slight for men in comparison to the other evaluations, yet similar in size for women (the evaluation*sex interaction was significant, $F_{(3,3792)}=11.27$, $p < .001$). However, sex did not moderate the identifiability effect (identification*sex: $p = .34$) or destabilize it (without sex, $F_{(4, 1269)}=4.69$, $p = .001$; with sex, $F_{(4,1264)}=3.98$, $p=.003$; see Appendix for more information).

Mediation. Following the same procedures of Experiment 1, we examined whether emotions mediated the identifiability effect. In Experiment 2, identification influenced only emotions towards the offender, as participants expressed more positive emotions towards the offender when he was identified, in all but the passive symmetric identification condition. This resulted in a significant indirect effect of the identified offender on the average evaluations gap through emotions towards the offender (only offender identified: a*b= -.21, BCa CI [-.35, -.06], $P_m=.52$; symmetric neutral identification: a*b= -.22, BCa CI [-.36, -.07], $P_m=.49$; symmetric active identification: a*b= -.18, BCa CI [-.32, -.04], $P_m=.38$). The mediator could account for roughly 50% of the total effect in the first two conditions and roughly 40% of the total effect in the symmetric active identification condition. Again, we find that one of the sources of the evaluations gap is the more positive emotional reaction evoked by an identified wrongdoer. In contrast to Experiment 1, rape myth beliefs were not influenced by identification in this experiment.

On more exploratory grounds, we examined the mediating role of fears of being victimized and being falsely accused of sexually offending. The results were negative, as identification did not influence fears of being falsely accused in any condition (path a was not significant; overall $p = .77$). And while identification reduced the fear of being victimized in the identified offender condition ($p = .02$), the mediation relationship was weak (a*b = -.045, 95% CI [-.087, -.011]) (see Appendix for more analyses).

Discussion. The results of Experiment 2 replicated the original identified offender effect, indicating its reliability. In addition, we found that the identified offender premium is robust to the inclusion of an identified victim in a neutral symmetric identification setting. Despite

the victim's identification, the identified offender continued to fare better than the unidentified offender. The identified offender premium extended not only from asymmetric to symmetric situations, but also from moral and factual evaluations to consequential decisions pertaining to taking measures against the offender.

In contrast, though in furtherance of the lack of a beneficial identified-victim effect in Experiment 1, we found that 'adding' the identification of the victim to a situation that includes an identified offender does not improve the victim's evaluation. This result dispels the possible concern that the victim's failure to generate an identification premium in Experiment 1 was due to the dearth of asymmetric identification cases in reality. From the perspective of the victim, having none of the parties identified to the public remains the best state of affairs.

Second, we observed that when both parties are identified, there is a significant difference between a passively identified victim and an actively identified one, and that mode of identification moderated the identifiability effect. The relative evaluations of the victim and the offender—in terms of their credibility, morality, blameworthiness, and responsibility for the event—were more favorable for the passively identified victim than for the actively identified victim. Although passive identification benefitted the victim neither directly nor beyond the state of mutual anonymity, it cancelled out the identification premium of the offender. Interestingly, neutral victim identification (which does not disclose the mode of identification) was identical to active identification and significantly different from passive identification, indicating that participants link identification with agency (at least in symmetric contexts). Similar to Experiment 1, emotions partially mediated the effect, again suggesting that the source of the offender's identification premium is the more positive emotions he evoked, consistent with the classic identifiability effect.

These results also suggest that the victims' failure to obtain a premium from neutral and active identification might be connected to the expectation that women be passive—and therefore could change for male victims and for less sexist participants. This hypothesis does not withstand the lack of significant interaction between participants' sex and identification (also observed in Experiment 1). Previous studies found that women are as likely to react against agentic women as men are. The prescriptiveness of the female stereotype as 'nice,' communal, and not agentic, creates strong incentives for women to abide by it and impose it on other women (Rudman 1998). Our findings suggest the hypothesis that actively identified victims in sexual harassment cases may be perceived as acting against gender roles, as compared to unidentified or passively identified victims. Consequently, actively identified

victims might pay the price of reduced credibility and likeability, which leads to the denial of identification benefits. We examine the gender roles hypothesis in Experiment 3.

C. Experiment 3: Switching Gender Roles

After observing that both asymmetric and symmetric identification benefit the offender, and that active identification harms the victim, we designed Experiment 3 to examine whether these effects are related to the gender of the victim and/or to participants' level of sexism. First, we duplicated the entire experimental setting to compare the effect of identification in stereotypical gender role cases (female victim and male offender, as in Experiments 1 and 2), with counter-stereotypical cases (*male* victim and *female* offender). Second, we measured gender stereotypes directly and examined their relation with the identifiability effect, drawing on the above-described Modern Sexism Scale (Swim et al. 1995; Swim and Cohen 1997).[16] Our two hypotheses were:

H3a: Agentic identification influences female and male victims differently.

H3b: Agentic identification's effect is moderated by sexist views.

Participants. We followed the same methods for power analysis, registration (AsPredicted.org #8145), and recruitment as in the previous experiments. A representative sample of 2,057 participants was recruited to participate in the study online. Due to panel limitations and in order to reach age and gender census quotas, we were not able to exclude all past participants. Among the participants, 140 (~7%) had participated in Experiment 1 or in Experiment 2. Out of those, 33 reported to have recalled their previous participation while answering questions for Experiment 3. Removing the returning participants from the data did not change the results (some results became more significant, but no significant result became less significant). Our analyses are based on the full sample, in line with our pre-registration.

Procedure. Experiment 3 included a 4 (*Identification*: None Identified/Identified Offender/Both Identified – Passive Victim/Both Identified – Active Victim) x 2 (*Gender Role*: Female Victim-Male Offender/Male Victim-Female Offender) between-subjects design. The only difference between gender roles was the flipping of the assigned roles; everything else, including the names used for the identified conditions, remained the same. Thus, while in the stereotypical gender role version the employee was called Rachel and the manager called David, in the counter-stereotypical version the employee was called David and the manager called Rachel. In this experiment, we did not include a neutral identification condition, as this condition was no different than active identification in Experiment 2.

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[16] We also measured perceptions of warmth and competence (Fiske et al. 2002). We provide details of these measures and their analysis in the Appendix.

Outcome Measures. Experiment 3 introduced a more parsimonious measure of the relative evaluations of the victim and the offender. After reading the scenario, participants evaluated the victim and the offender on three continuous scales of 1 to 9, where 1 indicated that the offender is absolutely more credible/blameworthy/moral and 9 indicated that the victim is absolutely more credible/blameworthy/moral (the scale's midpoint, 5, indicated that both are equally credible/blameworthy/moral; notably, changing the scale also changed the numerical range of the results). We also modified the question of whether or not sexual harassment had occurred to allow for a more nuanced decision, replacing the binary (yes/no) answer with a scale of 1 (*Not at all*) to 7 (*Absolutely*).

Moderators and mediators. In addition to measuring evoked emotions, participants filled out the Modern Sexism questionnaire (MS), with references to the United States replaced with references to Israel. The full text of all measures is included in the Appendix.[17]

Results. The data was analyzed using a general linear model (Between/Within-Subject ANOVA), with the three relative evaluations—credibility, blameworthiness (reversed), and morality—as a within-subject factor (Evaluation), and Identification and Gender Role as between-subject factors. Gender Role had a significant, albeit small, effect: across conditions, male victims fared slightly worse (M=5.72, SD=1.27) than female victims (M=5.83, SD=1.31; $F_{(1,2118)}$ = 4.24, *p*=.04, 95% CI [-.174, -.004], d=.09; this also meant that female offenders fared slightly better than male offenders).[18]

Identification had a significant main effect ($F_{(3,2118)}$ = 3.61, *p*=.01). Importantly, the identified offender premium held for offenders of both genders. In other words, the female offender also benefited from identification (at the expense of her unidentified male victim) (Control/Offender Identified contrast estimate = -.204, 95% CI [-.359, -.05]; *p* = .01, d=.15). Intriguingly, while the gender of the offender did not matter for the identifiability premium, the gender of the victim 'flipped' the active/passive effect. Female victims fared better when identified passively (M=5.9, SD=1.2) rather than actively (M=5.7, SD=1.32), thus replicating Experiment 2's results. In contrast, male victims fared worse when identified passively (M=5.57, SD=1.23) rather than actively (M=5.73, SD=1.21) (See Figure 4). Comparing only the passive and active identification conditions yielded a significant Identification*Gender

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[17] The Appendix also reports on the results of exploratory mediation analyses, e.g., perceptions regarding the prevalence of women harassed by men and vice versa, that did not yield significant results.

[18] Note that measuring the victim-offender gap on a single 1–9 scale somewhat changed the interpretation of the means, as a 5 average implies that the victim and the offender were evaluated as equally credible/moral/blameworthy and any higher score means that the victim was evaluated more favorably than the offender.

Role crossover interaction ($F_{(1,1055)}$=5.193, $p = .023$, d=.16), which rendered the identifiability effect non-significant ($p = .82$), as expected in a crossover interaction.

Figure 4: The Impact of Identification and Gender Roles in Exp. 3

In addition to their effect on the moral and factual evaluations, Identification and Gender Role had a highly significant influence on participants' judgments regarding the occurrence of sexual harassment in the event. Identification negatively influenced participants' willingness to determine that sexual harassment had occurred in all conditions ($F_{(3,2118)} = 4.74$, $p = .003$), most strongly impacting the actively identified victim (control/active contrast estimate = -.384, 95% CI [-.592, -.176], $p < .001$, d=.23).[19] Across conditions, participants were also less likely to determine that the male victim was harassed (-.225 compared with a female victim, 95% CI [-.373, -.077], $F_{(1,2118)} = 8.942$, $p = .003$, d=.16). The interaction term between Identification and Gender Role was not statistically significant.[20]

Notably, the effects of Identification and Gender Role were comparable in magnitude to the effect of participants' own gender. While participants' gender naturally had the largest effect on their judgments (men/women contrast estimate = -.598, 95% CI [-.451, -.746], $p < .001$, d=.36), Identification's effect was roughly 64% the size of the sex effect, and Gender

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[19] For female victims, the negative effect of identification on sexual harassment determinations extended in Experiment 3 to *passive* identification; control/passive contrast estimate=-.35, 95% CI [-.65,-.05], p=.024 (however, passive identification did not differ from the control with respect to the other evaluations). For male victims, the negative effect of identification was not significant with respect to sexual harassment determinations, but was significant with respect to the other evaluations in all identification conditions, including active identification (control/active contrast =-.221, $p = .05$).

[20] The interaction term became statistically significant when past participants were removed.

Role's effect was roughly 40% the size of the sex effect.[21] As in our previous experiments, participants' sex did not interact with Identification ($p = .61$), and the effect of Identification ($F_{(3,2041)} = 4.74$, $p=.003$) remained highly significant with sex in the model. Yet each sex showed in-group favoritism (Gender Role*Sex: $F_{(1,2110)}=24$, $p<.001$), and a three-way interaction emerged between Identification*Gender Role*Sex in the analysis of victim-offender evaluations ($F_{(6,2110)} = 2.14$, $p=.042$), which appears to explain the active/passive contrast, shown in Figure 5 below.

Figure 5: The Impact of Identification, Gender Roles, and Sex in Exp. 3

Notes: The figure demonstrates the mean victim-offender evaluation (who is more credible and moral and less blameworthy on a 1–9 scale) as a function of Identification, Gender Role, and participants' sex. Offenders of both sexes benefited from Identification, $F_{(3,2118)} = 3.61$, $p=.01$. Participants of both sexes favored victims and offenders of their own sex, $F_{(1,2110)}=24$, $p<.001$. Men 'penalized' the female victim when she actively identified but favored the actively identified male victim, $F_{(6,2110)} = 2.14$, $p=.042$. Women did not distinguish between modes of identification, though they too did not evaluate female victims more favorably when they were identified.

 Turning to examine the impact of gender attitudes, we reverse-coded the relevant items and verified the reliability of the MS scale (Cronbach's alpha=.771, M=2.6, SD=0.79). The pre-conditions for mediation were not met: MS was not influenced by Identification ($p=.946$) or its interaction with Gender Role ($p=.913$) and therefore could not mediate these effects.

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[21] Table A3.2 in the Appendix presents the means, standard errors, and confidence intervals for participants' sexual harassment judgments.

Given MS's independence from Identification, we examined whether MS moderated the effect; namely, whether Identification operated differently at different levels of MS.

This analysis yielded a highly significant three-way-interaction between Identification* Gender Role*MS ($F_{(7,2037)} = 10.11$, $p<.001$ for evaluations; $F_{(7,2037)} = 4.22$, $p<.001$ for sexual harassment judgments). Figure 6 probes the interaction by observing the effect of Identification and Gender Role at one standard deviation below and above the MS mean. This was a crossover interaction: The effects of Identification and Gender Role both reversed at different levels of MS. Table A3.1 in the Appendix provides the means and confidence intervals for this analysis and Figure A2 plots the effects at the MS mean.

The results show that participants with high MS scores penalized actively-identified female victims but not actively-identified male victims, perceiving the latter as more credible, less blameworthy, and more moral than active female victims. In contrast, these participants judged passively-identified male and female victims similarly. Participants with high MS scores were also less likely to judge the case of actively-identified female victims as sexual harassment as compared with actively-identified male victims. In contrast, participants with low MS scores did not differentiate between active and passive identification for either male or female victims. Generally, participants with low sexism scores were associated with higher evaluations of the female than of the male victim, and the reverse for participants with high sexism scores. Participants with mean MS scores showed very small differences between victims and almost no passive/active Identification contrast (see Appendix).

Given the moderating effect of both participants' sex and sexist views, we examined the relationship between these factors. Sex and MS scores were correlated ($r=.38$, $p < .001$),[22] but MS was not uniquely associated with men. Roughly categorizing our participants into three MS groups—High (+1 SD or more above the mean), Low (-1 SD or more below the mean), and Middle (everyone else), we found around 66% of both men and women to be in the middle group. The High MS group contained 27% of men and 7% of women, and the Low MS group contained 9% of men and 25% of women.

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[22] This correlation created a multicollinearity problem that rendered it difficult to examine their relative effects; yet their eta-square was similar (0.05, medium effect size).

Figure 6. The Impact of Identification, Gender Roles, and Modern Sexism in Experiment 3

Notes: The upper panels present the mean victim-offender evaluation (who is more credible and moral and less blameworthy, measured on a 1–9 scale) as a function of Identification, Gender Role, and MS. 1 SD below the mean (low MS) is on the left, 1 SD above the mean (high MS) is on the right. The bottom panels present the mean sexual harassment determination on a 1–7 scale as a function of the same. Low MS participants did not distinguish in general between different modes of victim identification. High MS participants exhibited the interaction between Identification mode and Gender Role, $F_{(7,2037)} = 10.11$, $p<.001$ for evaluations; $F_{(7,2037)} = 4.22$, $p<.001$ for sexual harassment judgments. Appendix Figure 2 presents the same for Mean MS participants.

We note several final findings. First, emotions again partially mediated the effect, with differences between male and female victims. When the victim was male, identification did not significantly influence the emotions evoked towards him, but significantly improved the emotions evoked towards his (female) offender. This effect partially mediated the total effect

of identification in the identified offender condition, ab= -.105, CI [-.21,-.01], P_m= .35, and in the passive symmetric condition, ab= -.14, CI [-.24,-.044], P_m= .38. Thus, when the offender was identified and the male victim was either anonymous or passive, emotions accounted for roughly 35-38% of the negative effect of identification on the male victim. When the victim was female, we found that identification significantly and negatively influenced emotions evoked towards the victim in the active identification condition, but did not impact the emotions towards the offender. This was a change from Experiments 1 and 2, where identification improved emotions towards the (male) offender. However, the overall result remained the same; emotions partially mediated the effect of identification, ab=-.1, CI [-.1887, -.0074], P_m=-.42, such that an actively identified female victim evoked more negative emotions, which in turn accounted for roughly 40% of the negative effect of identification on the female victim.

Second, although identification did not generally influence character judgments (see the Appendix), both male and female victims were perceived as less publicity-seeking in the passive-identification condition ($F_{(3,2053)}$ = 4.358, p = .005), and offenders were viewed as least manipulative in the active identification condition ($F_{(3,2053)}$ = 2.75, p = .04, none/active contrast estimate = -.301, p = .009). However, none of these character judgments mediated the identification effect.[23]

Discussion. Our results shed further light on the identifiability effect and the factors that shape it in symmetric identification situations of sexual harassment. We found that the effect of active/passive identification is contingent on gender roles, as actively identified victims fare worse if they are female and fare better if they are male (compared with passively identified victims of the same gender). We further showed that this reversal is moderated by participants' sex and 'modern' sexism (which are somewhat related), and particularly by people who demonstrate highly sexist views. Notably, passively identified female victims fared better than active ones, but—in contrast to Experiment 2—passive identification did not offset the offender's premium from identification, as on some measures, even passively identified victims still fared worse than anonymous victims.

The results of Experiment 3 clarify that identification can result in a penalty for victims, particularly when the victim is female and is actively identified; and that modern sexism, participants' sex, and their interaction with gender role appear to explain this penalty. However, these factors do not explain the identified *offender* premium, which was observed in all three experiments.

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[23] A summary of the analysis of the additional proposed mediators is included in the Appendix.

IV. General Discussion

In this Part, we further analyze the experimental findings and their possible ramifications. We summarize our main results, underscore their contribution to the existing literature, and suggest explanations for the phenomena observed. We then discuss potential normative implications of the identifiability effect for the fight against sexual harassment. Finally, we acknowledge the limitations of the present study and point to avenues for fruitful future research.

A. Summary and Analysis of Findings

Our experiments demonstrate that the identifiability effect is a powerful phenomenon that extends beyond the settings tested in the literature to date, which largely focused on pro-social decisions regarding monetary donations in life-threatening situations. We observed an identifiability effect in a heretofore unexplored and important context of blameworthy behavior—sexual harassment.

Three experiments revealed that identification—by first name only—worked to the benefit of the *offender*, even though the identifying information was minimal and conveyed no meaningful data. Respondents viewed an identified wrongdoer as more credible and moral, and less blameworthy and responsible for the event, than an unidentified wrongdoer. Furthermore, when the offender was identified, respondents were less inclined to regard the situation as sexual harassment and less inclined to take measures against the offender. Notably, the favorable effect of identification was observed with respect to both male and female offenders. Both women and men participants showed identified offender premium, which was robust to the inclusion of a neutrally and actively identified victim (but sometimes, a passively identified victim could offset the offender's premium).

In contrast, identification was generally not beneficial for the victim. It did not increase the victim's credibility or lead more people to view the event as sexual harassment. Moreover, when both parties were identified by their first name, identifiability could actually worsen the victim's position. This detrimental effect was influenced by the type of identification involved, and differed for male and female victims. Female victims fared worse when they identified *actively*—when they were willing to disclose their name in public. Active identification resulted in a perception of less credibility and morality, more blameworthiness and responsibility for the event, and less determinations that sexual harassment had occurred. This penalty occurred also in the absence of express information on the mode of identification, perhaps because people infer agency from identification. Contrarily, when

female victims were identified passively and requested that their name not be revealed publicly, they fared better on all these parameters, at times similarly to the scenario in which both parties were *unidentified*. Male victims, in contrast, were not penalized for active identification.

Our findings suggest several reasons for the disparate impact of identification on offenders and victims. First, we found that gender roles are a factor that reverses the disparate impact of active identification for male and female victims. Second, we observed that the disparate effects of active and passive identification were moderated by participants' sex and by modern sexism. The suspicion against actively identified female victims might also be related to stereotypical views that an agentic woman could not have been the target of harassment or has actively pursued the sexual relationship.

Having examined various factors, we found that the identified offender premium is partially mediated by the positive emotional reaction towards identified offenders (and, in Experiment 3, also the less positive emotional reaction towards their victims). Importantly, the premium is a function neither of the victim/offender's gender, nor of participants' gender, level of sexism, distress, fears of being sexually harassed or falsely accused of harassment, perceptions of social norms regarding sexual harassment, age, religious affiliation, or political affiliation. We also found no general pattern of character traits that mediates the effect. While identification had a small impact on respondents' determination regarding two character traits—namely, publicity-seeking for the victim and manipulative for the offender—the effects did not portray a theoretically compelling mediation relationship. Further research could map additional moderators and mediators of the identifiability effect.

In sum, in sexual harassment cases, identifiability may have a disparate impact on the persons involved. The experiments revealed three types of disparities: between identified and unidentified individuals; between victims and offenders; and between women and men, vis-à-vis the *mode* of identification (active/passive). Generally speaking, from the perspective of the wrongdoer, identification is beneficial. This conclusion is counter-intuitive, as it is commonly assumed that identification in the context of sexual harassment is only detrimental for alleged offenders.[24] In contrast, from the perspective of the victim, the best scenario appears to be

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[24] The fact that the identified offender is evaluated more favorably than the unidentified offender, and that this advantage persists even when the victim is also identified, does not necessarily imply that offenders would always enjoy net benefits from identification. When anonymity also shields offenders from grappling with various costs, such as reputation or privacy loss and public shaming, they may ultimately prefer anonymity to identification. Our focus in this study, however, is on factors that affect *public judgments* about sexual harassment cases, as people's opinions regarding both parties would influence the existence and scope of sexual misconduct complaints. Furthermore, these judgments may

mutual anonymity and the worst scenario is active identification (at least for female victims in symmetric identification contexts). This conclusion, too, is surprising; other things being equal, willingness to identify in public could have been associated with courage and credibility and could be rewarded accordingly.

The experimental results indicate that the effect of identification is nuanced and complex. As explained in Part II, a few psychological studies found that identifiability can harm identified wrongdoers: it may trigger a punitive reaction (Small and Loewenstein 2005) or decrease people's willingness to help (Kogut 2011). The present study demonstrates that in certain contexts, identification can also be advantageous to wrongdoers. Moreover, we found that identification can be disadvantageous to the victims of blameworthy behavior in cases where the facts or their interpretation are in dispute—where the identified accused person could potentially be perceived as a "victim" as well.

Our findings advance the study by Lewinsohn-Zamir et al. (2017). As described above, this vignette study examined the choices participants made regarding legal remedies and fines, finding that participants were more lenient and considerate towards wrongdoers who were identified by their first name than towards anonymous ones. The authors suggested (id., 530–31) that this may be due to the fact that the transgressions in their experiments—such as breaching a contract to mitigate losses, failing to prevent one's cow from damaging a neighbor's property, or littering in a public park—were comparatively mild and did not involve moral turpitude. The present study shows that this favorable effect of identification extends to behavior that is more blameworthy. That said, we concede that the vignettes used in our study were not 'extreme,' in that they did not include physical violence or severe sexual abuse.

Another possible reason Lewinsohn-Zamir et al. (2017, 532) offered for the beneficial impact of identification on wrongdoers was that although both parties to the civil disputes depicted were identified by name, the vignettes still focused respondents' attention on the legal sanction appropriate for the injuring party. Consequently, perhaps, identification mainly affected responses towards the injurer. Our study demonstrates that identification can benefit the wrongdoer even when the victim's perspective is no less salient than that of the offender. Each vignette included both the victim's and the offender's version of the event. Furthermore, the questions that followed related to both parties. In a certain respect, the two studies reinforce each other's findings regarding identifiability and wrongdoing: The current study

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affect the consequences for each of the parties, at least when the conflict is confined to the public arena and does not lead to a judicial or semi-judicial decision.

indicates that the beneficial impact of identification on offenders is not limited to cases where the victims' account is less salient. The former study addresses the possibility that the beneficial impact of identification is due *exclusively* to the factual ambiguity in the present study—as the alleged offender denied some of the facts and their interpretation. As mentioned above, in Lewinsohn-Zamir et al. (2017) there was no factual dispute as respondents were informed expressly that a violation of rights or rules had occurred. Still, identification led to more favorable treatment of the wrongdoer.

After summarizing the main findings, we proceed to consider their potential implications.

B. Normative Implications

An issue that commonly arises with respect to a behavioral phenomenon is whether it is irrational and therefore should be debiased. The psychological literature has noted that minimal information like a name, a photo, or a number does not provide a good reason for favoring or disfavoring the identified person. For example, such information does not justify allocating more resources to identified victims than anonymous ones (Kogut and Ritov 2005b, 114; Small, Loewenstein and Slovic 2007, 143–44). However, researchers have also acknowledged that the problem may lie not with the stronger reactions to identifiable individuals per se, but rather in the disparate attitude toward or treatment of anonymous and non-anonymous persons. That is to say, it is not always clear which of these two reactions is 'correct.' Take, for example, instances where greater donations are given to an identified person than to an unidentified person. One could view this as meaning that the donations to the identified individual are excessive—but it is equally possible that the interests of the anonymous recipient are unduly discounted, and that minimal identification corrects this bias (Small, Loewenstein and Slovic 2007, 144). Does this claim apply equally to the sexual harassment scenario? Arguably, some aspects of the identifiability effect more clearly lead to undesirable outcomes in this context. The disparate impact of identification for victims and offenders, active and passive identifiers, and men and women victims, seems irrational. Knowing an offender's first name, for example, should not change the assessment of identical facts and lead to the conclusion that sexual harassment had not occurred, compared with knowing the victim's first name. Similarly, it seems unreasonable that a female victim should be regarded as not to have suffered from sexual harassment if she is willing to reveal her name in public.

If we assume that the identifiability effect is undesirable in these contrasts, can it be debiased? The answer to this question is unclear. To date, experimental attempts to debias the identifiability effect in the context of monetary donations have not yielded encouraging

results. The debiasing techniques used (e.g., educating potential donors about this psychological phenomenon) only undermined sympathy and compassion toward the identified recipient without kindling such emotions toward unidentified recipients. As a result, overall generosity was reduced (Kogut and Ritov 2005b; Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic 2007). In Experiment 3, we found that sexism moderated the disparate effect of identifiability on active and passive men and women victims. This finding suggests that general efforts to reduce sexism and promote gender equality in society—through vehicles such as education, social norms and legal rules—are also likely (if successful) to mitigate some of the undesirable effects of identification in sexual harassment cases. Regrettably, however, social changes typically occur gradually, over a long period of time (Lessig 1996; Minow 2010).

Given that it may not be possible to eliminate the identifiability effect, what are the implications of this phenomenon for the fight against sexual harassment? To be sure, the shift from experimental results to normative recommendations must be undertaken with great caution. First, our experiments did not examine judicial or prosecutorial decision-making, and we do not intend to generalize from them to these processes. Our interest is in public opinion and the ways it can shape social outcomes of interest for legal decision-makers. Given this particular interest, the typical external validity concern becomes less substantial, as our experiments were conducted with representative general population samples. A further reason for caution when suggesting implications is that normative debates usually involve complex and sometimes conflicting considerations. We do not argue that considerations based on the identifiability effect should necessarily trump other considerations; but rather, that the different types of identifiability effects should be taken into account, alongside other relevant factors. The actual weight assigned to this phenomenon should vary with the relevant circumstances. With these caveats in mind, we offer some tentative observations.

Sexual harassment cannot be confronted if the victim does not complain. Furthermore, as the recent #MeToo campaign has shown, allegations of sexual harassment are quite often dealt with in the public arena and do not always culminate with a formal judicial or disciplinary decision.[25] But even when a complaint eventually leads to a judicial or semi-judicial procedure—in which typically, both parties are identified to the decision-makers—

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[25] For an extensive list of powerful men who were fired, forced to resign or retire, or suspended following public allegations of sexual misconduct, see Sarah Almukhtar, Michael Gold, and Larry Buchanan, *After Weinstein: 71 Men Accused of Sexual Misconduct and Their Fall from Power*, N.Y. TIMES (Feb 8. 2018), available at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/10/us/men-accused-sexual-misconduct-weinstein.html. Featured in the list are famous figures such as actors Kevin Spacey and Jeffrey Tambor, television hosts Matt Lauer and Charlie Rose, Federal appeals court judge Alex Kozinski, US Senator Al Franken, and orchestra conductors James Levine and Charles Dutiot.

this process still commences with a silence-breaker. One of the factors that likely affects willingness to complain against an offender is other people's consequent reactions, both in the victims' immediate surroundings (e.g., the workplace or neighborhood) and in wider public circles (e.g., the media and social networks).[26] The findings that identification might work to the benefit of the offender and to the detriment of the victim—in terms of perceived credibility, morality, blameworthiness, and determinations whether sexual harassment actually occurred—imply that victims would suffer a smaller injury to their reputation and dignity, and hence would be more likely to come forward, if their public anonymity is maintained. Put differently, although both parties are inevitably identified to the relevant decision-makers—be they disciplinary tribunals, police officers, prosecutors, judges, or jurors—there is likely to be more reporting of sexual harassment if the anonymity of both parties is preserved outside the investigation and adjudication processes.

Note also that the disparate impact of identification on offenders and victims may be more pronounced in real life than in an experiment. For instance, while we found a favorable identifiability effect when respondents knew only the offender's first name, in reality the public may also see an attractive photograph of the wrongdoers, or learn about their virtues and achievements from family and friends. The disparate effect of identification on offenders and victims suggests that the achievements of the #MeToo movement may have come at a cost for some of the women involved. The findings that active identification adversely influences the victim are particularly interesting in that regard, due to the shift towards active identification that followed #MeToo. Our study suggests that the price of active identification for women is higher than currently assumed: Even if the victim is *not* portrayed in the press or social media in particularly negative, derogative, or critical terms, the mere fact of identification, in and of itself, might work to her detriment and to the offender's benefit. The existence and magnitude of this adverse impact depends on various factors, such as the prevalence of sexism in one's community. It stands to reason, for example, that highly sexist societies involve greater risk for victims willing to publicly come forward.[27]

Preserving anonymity in sexual harassment disputes raises a few thorny issues. One problem is that it requires legal restrictions on public identification, such as court-issued gag

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[26] As Dodd et al. (2001, 569) stated in the context of sexist treatment: "One of the most common fears that prevents women from instigating a confrontation is the fear of how others will perceive their actions".

[27] The Appendix analyzes the interaction between active/passive identification and religiosity and political conservativeness. Both factors had significant weak-medium correlations with MS, but religious conservatives were not more influenced by identification than others in our sample, presumably because MS was not particularly high within these groups.

orders that prohibit identification of the parties. These restraints might conflict with other important values, like freedom of the press and freedom of speech (Whitebread and Contreras 1996; Morris 2003). Another important value is that of public trial. A public hearing safeguards the interests of the accused by enabling scrutiny of the legal process, promoting confidence in the judicial system, and serving educational, expressive, and deterrence purposes (Duff 1986, 148; Shnoor and Menashe 2017; Steinman 1985, 13–18). Consequently, the law must strike a balance between the interests of the alleged victim and offender, and even those of third parties[28] or the public at large. Discussion of these complex issues lies beyond the scope of this study. For our purposes, suffice it to note that different countries vary in their willingness to limit freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and the principle of public trial. The United States recognizes few exceptions to these rights, even in cases of sexual offenses (Marcus and McMahon 1991; Barendt 2005, 351; Reidy 2005; Pahl 2008); however, the right of offenders to maintain anonymity may sometimes be viewed as part of their right to a fair trial (Whitebread and Contreras 1996; Fein, McCloskey, and Tomlinson 1997).[29] In contrast, countries like the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Germany, and Israel are more willing to limit public identification in sexual misconduct cases[30] (and other types of cases), to protect the privacy and dignity of the parties and prevent prejudicing the trial (Barendt 2005, 312–16, 322–36; Horovitz and Weigend 2011, 282–84; Resta 2008).[31] In such legal systems, the publication of the parties' identity prior to the judgment is not necessarily regarded as a matter of public interest.[32] Note also that the balance between the conflicting

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[28] For example, if the offender's name is not revealed to the public, suspicion may fall on all members associated with the relevant group. Thus, if it is only disclosed that a faculty member from a certain university department is accused of sexual harassment, then all such members might become suspects in the public eye. See T.S.R. v. J.C., 671 A2d 1068, 1075 (1996) (citing this consideration in its refusal to grant a protective order that would preserve the anonymity in civil proceedings of a church minister accused of sexual molestation).

[29] For criticism of the limited restrictions upon prejudicial media reporting in the United States, see Geragos 2006; Phillipson 2008. For a meta-analysis of studies on the negative effect of pretrial publicity on jurors, see Steblay et al. 1999.

[30] See, for example, the British Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992.

[31] Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights declares that "everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing" and that "judgment shall be pronounced publicly". Simultaneously, it recognizes situations in which the press and the public may be excluded from all or part of the trial, including "where […] the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice." In a similar vein, the *Sub Judice* doctrine (incorporated, e.g., in the United Kingdom's Contempt of Court Act 1981), imposes liability on publications about ongoing legal proceedings that create a substantial risk of seriously impeding or prejudicing the course of justice. See Shnoor and Menashe 2017; Geragos 2006, 1190–95.

[32] However, such publication may be considered of public interest if, for example, the alleged crime is a major one or the suspect is a public figure. Resta 2008, 54–58.

interests can vary according to the type of proceeding involved. Maintaining anonymity vis-à-vis the public may be more justifiable during a disciplinary procedure than a criminal or civil trial.[33]

Our findings add a new consideration to the debate. For instance, when courts decide whether to grant a gag-order request, or when disciplinary tribunals rule on whether to maintain confidentiality, they should take the identifiability effect into account. Allowing defendants to remain anonymous towards the public may protect not only their own rights to privacy or to a fair trial, but also the interests of their victims. Furthermore, identifying the victims not only invades their privacy, but might inflict on them an additional injury due to the detrimental effect of identification—in and of itself—on their social standing and public image. Indeed, our findings indicate that a female victim may fare better in the public eye if she attempts to maintain her anonymity but ultimately fails—and thus would probably be perceived as a 'passive identifier'—than if she does nothing to prevent the publication or identifies actively. This consideration is also relevant to identification by others in a social network post—which, practicably, may not be preventable (Barendt 2005, 451–54, 468–74; Flood 2009).

A second problem with preserving anonymity relates to its effect on the probability of the event being reported to the public at all. In theory, the media—be it a newspaper, TV network, or internet blog—can inform the public about a case of sexual harassment without disclosing identifying information about the victim and/or the offender. Therefore, the existence of a court-issued gag order or the fact that a journalist decided to exercise self-restraint and not disclose real names or identifying images should not preclude media coverage of the event and hence prevent the public from knowing about what has occurred. In practice, however, anonymity can detrimentally affect news reporting. The communications literature has long dealt with questions like what constitutes 'news,' which information is selected for publication, and how that information is presented to the public (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Östgaard 1965; Shoemaker 1996). Generally speaking, news reporting tends to be personified; it often focuses on people rather than on abstract social issues and problems,

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[33] According to the Hebrew University of Jerusalem's regulations for the prevention of sexual harassment, the default rule is that all information, procedures, and decisions are confidential until the final judgment, although the disciplinary tribunal may accept a defendant's request for a public hearing (section 19). After a final decision has been reached, the tribunal's ruling can be published without details that might lead to identification of the victim (section 16). See https://hatrada.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/hatrada/files/takanon_sexual_harassment_1-2016.pdf.

based on the presumption that human beings are interested in, and identify with, other human beings (Östgaard 1965, 47–48; Harcup and O'neill 2001, 269–74; Ostfeld and Mutz 2014, 53–54).[34] Furthermore, news stories are often framed in an episodic rather than a thematic way. Episodic framing conveys information about an issue by presenting a specific event or a particular case (e.g., covering the issue of poverty by focusing on the plight of a particular poor person). In contrast, thematic framing presents information in a more general manner and places an issue in its broader context (e.g., reporting on poverty by offering statistical figures or commentary by professionals on the impact of the economy on poverty) (Ostfeld and Mutz 2014, 54–57). Episodic framing of news is particularly prevalent when the information concerns individuals who are not well-known, and when the event's outcome is not especially extreme (e.g., does not involve severe injury or death) (Galtung and Ruge 1965, 66–72; Herbert 2000, 63–64; Harcup and O'neill 2001, 272–79).[35]

This state of affairs implies that totally anonymous reporting on the sexual harassment of 'ordinary' people is not very likely to occur. Without identifying information—like a name and/or a photo—about at least one of the parties, the event would probably not be 'sensational' or interesting enough to be regarded as newsworthy. Consequently, preserving anonymity may come at the expense of informing the public about a pervasive social problem and thereby affecting public opinion on this matter.

A third concern about preserving anonymity relates to the victims themselves. Even if identification may have a detrimental effect on victims of sexual harassment, it does not necessarily follow that we should encourage (or even advise) victims to remain anonymous, to expend financial and emotional resources on preserving their anonymity, or to refrain (if the victims are women) from actively identifying themselves. Arguably, hiding one's identity can be harmful to a person's dignity and self-respect, whereas identification—despite its social costs—could be empowering (as evidenced by at least some of the women and men featured in the *Time* magazine Person of the Year 2017 issue, mentioned above). Even if

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[34] Gatlung and Ruge (1965, 68–69) offer various explanations for the phenomenon of personification, positing that it results from a cultural ideal that people control their destinies and satisfies recipients' needs for positive or negative identification, as well as that it is much harder to gather the data and present a structure-centered news story than it is to tell a person-centered news story.

[35] Communication studies further inform us about another relevant feature of personified, event-oriented coverage: Episodic framing of news may lead its recipients to attribute responsibility to the individuals involved in the event, which under certain circumstances promotes blaming the victims for their situation (e.g., for being in a state of poverty). Thematic framing, in contrast, commonly engenders a stronger sense of government or social responsibility for the reported problem (Iyengar 1990, 1991; Gross 2008). This characteristic of episodic news reporting may augment the adverse effect of identification on victims.

unabashed, active identification may be disadvantageous to the victim in the short-run, the opposite may be true in the long-run. Furthermore, active identification may be necessary in order to bring about desirable changes in social norms relating to gender roles and acceptable sexual behavior. In this respect, we should also consider that even if identification benefits the offender in the short-term, it may still serve an important social function: As experience shows, after one victim publicly names her or his harasser, additional victims of the same offender acquire the courage to come forward. The accumulating complaints may strengthen the case against the offender and eventually benefit the first victim. If both parties remain anonymous, others would have no way of knowing that they are not alone.[36]

Notwithstanding these considerations, we should not expect every victim of sexual harassment to be an agent of social change or to bear willingly the significant burden that such a goal requires. Therefore, given the disparate impact of identification in this context, we should not penalize victims who prefer to remain anonymous. Notably, we should not infer from refusal to identify alone that the victim is less reliable or less credible, just as we should not let the identifiability effect bias us against actively identified victims.[37]

C. Limitations and Future Research

While findings from the present study indicate potential policy implications, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of our study and point to directions for further research. First, although we show that the identifiability effect can benefit alleged offenders, we tested its existence in a relatively mild "his/her word against mine" situation. More research is necessary to discover the upper boundary of the favorable impact on wrongdoers. Would identification still be beneficial for the offender in cases of extreme wrongful

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[36] This challenge comprised the basis for an argument in support of information escrow systems, laid out by Ayres and Unkovic (2012) and later developed into Callisto, a third-party reporting system for victims of sexual assault on college campuses. The Callisto system accepts anonymous sexual harassment reports and initiates investigation of the reports once there is a 'match' between two or more complaints against the same person. In this way, the formal complaint gains credibility and strengthens its evidentiary basis. See https://www.projectcallisto.org/who-we-are.

[37] Regrettably, enforcers, such as police investigators, may share the belief that anonymous complainants are less reliable. In Israel, Police Commissioner Roni Alsheich was quoted in the media as saying that he will not investigate anonymous complaints about sexual harassment within the police force. However, the Ministry of Justice's Police Internal Investigations Department (*Machash*) immediately responded that it will examine every complaint and encouraged even anonymous reporting of sexual misconduct. See https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-top-cop-to-ignore-anonymous-harassment-claims-1.5417117?=&ts=_1529088214243. Cf. A.B.C. v. XYZ Corporation, 660 A2d 1199, 1204 (1995) (stating, with respect to a jury trial, that a defendant "might well be prejudiced in defending against a complaint by being perceived as a wrongdoer by the very fact of anonymity alone."

behavior, such as murder, rape, or other infliction of grave bodily injury? Would identification become beneficial for the victim under such circumstances?

Second, our experiments focused on a prevalent example of blameworthy behavior—sexual harassment. One main reason for this choice is that all the variants of identification and anonymity explored in our study exist with respect to media reporting on this offense; in real life, both parties can be identified or unidentified in public, or one of the parties may be identified while the other is not. Future studies should examine whether a similar identifiability effect exists in relation to other types of offenses.

Third, some studies of the identifiability effect in the context of monetary donations have also documented a *singularity effect*; at least under certain circumstances, the favorable impact of identification on donation recipients and the greater willingness to help them occurred only with respect to a single identified individual and did not extend to a group of identified people. In other words, the group received less contributions than the single person.[38] It could be worthwhile to examine whether a singularity effect exists in the context of sexual harassment, for example when there are numerous victims (as was the case with the allegations of women against movie producer Harvey Weinstein and actor-comedian Bill Cosby). Would this asymmetry alter the effect of identification for offenders and victims? It would be interesting to see, for instance, if the detrimental effect of identification on the single victim would be eliminated when a group of victims is involved. If so, then contrary to the monetary-donation scenarios tested in the psychological literature, in the context of blameworthy behavior the singularity effect would actually lead to a desirable outcome.

Fourth, the present study contrasted complete anonymity with identification by a person's actual name. An intermediate possibility—which exists in the context of sexual misconduct allegations[39]—is a pseudonym. What would be the effect of using a pseudonym on people's judgments regarding sexual harassment? This is hard to predict. The identifiability effect was observed in psychological studies even with minimal and meaningless identification, such as knowing an individual's 'number' (Small and Loewenstein 2003; Haran and Ritov 2014). In comparison, a person using a pseudonym is no less 'identified.' Furthermore, knowing a non-famous person's *real* private name does not really give us more information about her than knowing her pseudonym. However, people may still react differently to a pseudonym. For instance, whereas people may perceive a woman's use of her true name in public as *active* identification, they may regard her use of a pseudonym as *passive* identification.

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[38] See note 6.
[39] As mentioned above (text accompanying note 1), one of the women appearing in the *Time* magazine reportage on the sexual harassment silence-breakers and the #MeToo movement used a pseudonym.

Consequently, only the former type of identification would incur the 'penalty' found in our experiments. In addition, we explained above why totally anonymous reporting about sexual harassment would not be prevalent in the media. In terms of newsworthiness, pseudonymous reporting—despite employment of some name—may be closer to anonymous than to identified reporting. Future studies can test the impact of identification by pseudonym.

Finally, the present study elicited judgments from a representative sample of the public, and the questionnaires dealt with an early stage of the sexual harassment conflict—the complaint made by the victim and the offender's response to it. It could be worthwhile to examine whether the initial identification in public, and particularly *its mode* (active or passive), has an ongoing effect on later stages of the legal or quasi-legal process, including on jurors and judges.[40]

V. Conclusion

Allegations of sexual harassment can be dealt with in various degrees of anonymity and identification vis-à-vis the public. Following the rise of the #MeToo movement, it seems that the public arena has become a central and consequential forum for addressing these allegations. The evaluation of facts and determination of guilt are no longer limited to the traditional sphere of the courtroom; many cases are processed in the court of public opinion, resulting in substantial consequences for the parties. Our study has shown that this state of affairs carries with it risks for victims of sexual misconduct. Due to the *identifiability effect*, even minimal public identification might work to the benefit of offenders and to the detriment of their victims, in particular women who are perceived to be active identifiers. Both men and women are affected by such identification, which is moderated by sexist beliefs. These findings highlight the challenge for the contemporary fight against sexual harassment: While the public identification of victims leads to major progress, it can come at a high personal cost. Now that this fight is carried out largely in the public sphere, it is ever-more important to be cognizant of the biases and prejudices that might affect public perceptions and judgments, and to consider the trade-offs that identification presents for individuals who experienced sexual harassment and for society as a whole.

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[40] In general, a host of experimental studies have demonstrated that judges also tend to use heuristics and to display cognitive biases. See Wistrich, Guthrie, and Rachlinsky 2005; Wistrich, Rachlinski, and Guthrie 2015; Zamir and Teichman 2018, 525–65.

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APPENDIX

Table of Contents

EXPERIMENT MATERIALS

Dependent Variables in Experiment 1

Dimension	No.	Item
Credibility	1a	To what extent do you believe the employee [Rachel]? [on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is "not at all" and 7 is "absolutely"]
	1b	To what extent do you believe the manager [David]? [same scale]
Responsibility	2a	To what extent did the employee's [Rachel's] behavior lead to the event at the office? [same scale]
	2b	To what extent did the manager's [David's] behavior lead to the event at the office? [same scale]
Blameworthiness	3a	To what extent should the employee [Rachel] be blamed for the event? [same scale]
	3b	To what extent should the manager [David] be blamed for the event? [same scale]
Morality	4a	Rate the employee's [Rachel's] behavior [on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is "not moral at all" and 7 is "absolutely moral"].
	4b	Rate the manager's [David's] behavior [same scale].
Emotions	5	Rate the extent to which you felt the following feelings [anger, empathy, pity] towards the employee [Rachel]/manager [David] [on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is "not at all", and 7 is "absolutely"]
Sexual Harassment	6	In your opinion, did the event involve sexual harassment? [Yes/No]
Belief in Rape Myths	7	What percentage of women who report a rape or sexual harassment would you say are lying because they are angry and want to get back at the man they accuse? (Adapted from Burt 1980, Table 2) [In most cases, in 75% of the cases, in 50% of the cases, in 25% of the cases, almost never].

New Dependent Variables in Experiment 2

Dimension	No.	Item
Consequences	1	In your opinion, how appropriate or inappropriate would it be for the event to have the following consequences [on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is "not appropriate at all" and 7 is "very appropriate"]: 1. There should be no consequences for the manager [David]. 2. The manager [David] should apologize to the employee [Rachel]. 3. The manager [David] should be transferred to another position or department within the firm. 4. The employee [Rachel] should be transferred to another position or department within the firm. 5. The manager [David] should face disciplinary proceedings. 6. The manager [David] should compensate the employee [Rachel] with a sum determined by an arbitrator or a judge. 7. The promotion of the manager [David] should be delayed. 8. The manager [David] should be fired. 9. The manager [David] should face criminal charges.
Norms	2	In your opinion, to what extent do people in society support or oppose sexual behavior and comments by a manager towards an employee? [on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is "highly supportive" and 7 is "highly opposed"].
	3	In your opinion, to what extent do people in society support or oppose the statutory prohibition on sexual harassment? [same scale].
	4	In your opinion, to what extent will opposition to sexual harassment rise or not rise in Israel in the coming years? Please rate from 1 ("will not rise at all") to 9 ("will rise very much").
Fears related to Sexual Harassment	5	Please rate your agreement with the following statements: [on a scale from 1 ("absolutely disagree") to 7 ("absolutely agree")]: 1. I fear that I will become a victim of sexual harassment. 2. I fear that I will become a victim of a false accusation of sexual harassment.

New Dependent Variables in Experiment 3

Dimension	No.	Item
Character	1	We shall now present you with possible descriptions of the employee [Rachel/David] and the manager [David/Rachel]. We ask you to provide your opinion of them based on the case you read. We know it is sometimes difficult to provide an opinion about someone in such situations and that sometimes it feels like more information could help. We thank you for your answers and ask that you do your best under the given circumstances. Please try to evaluate the employee [Rachel/David] and the manager [David/Rachel] with respect to the following

		characteristics: [on a scale from 1 ("not at all") to 7 ("very much")]:
		  1. Warm
		  2. Professional
		  3. Publicity seeking
		  4. Vindictive
		  5. Strong
		  6. Manipulative
		  7. Spontaneous
		  8. Confident
		  9. Honest
		  10. Brave
		  11. Hysterical
		  12. Weak

Modern Sexism	2	Translated to Hebrew from Swim et al. (1995).
		References to 'the United States' were replaced with 'Israel':
		  1. Discrimination against women is no longer a problem in Israel.
		  2. Women often miss out on good jobs due to sexual discrimination.
		  3. It is rare to see women treated in a sexist manner on television.
		  4. Israeli society has reached the point where women and men have equal opportunities for achievement.
		  5. It is easy to understand the anger of women's groups in Israel.
		  6. It is easy to understand why women's groups are still concerned about societal limitations of women's opportunities.
		  7. Over the past few years, the government and news media have been showing more concern about the treatment of women than is warranted by women's actual experiences.

Political Affiliation	3	How do you identify yourself politically? [from "very right wing" to "very left wing", with "center" as the scale midpoint].
Prevalence of Sexual Harassment	4	What is your estimation of the percentage of women in the population who are harassed by men, from 0% to 100%?
	5	What is your estimation of the percentage of men in the population who are harassed by women, from 0% to 100%?
Belief in Rape Myths	6	What percentage of women who report a rape or sexual harassment would you say are lying because they are angry and want to get back at the man they accuse? [In most cases, in 80% of the cases, 70%, 60%, ...10% of the cases, almost never]

Past Participation	7	Have you participated in a similar study about sexual harassments in the previous months? Please answer frankly. Your answer will not influence your compensation.
		  1. No, this is the first time.
		  2. Yes, but the case and the questions were different.

3. Yes, the case was identical or very similar, but I did not recall my previous answers while answering the present questionnaire.
4. Yes, the case was identical, and I recalled my previous answers while answering the present questionnaire.
5. Other _____.

EXPERIMENT 1

Mediation analysis

In addition to the mediators described in the main text, we measured participants' level of belief in a just world (BJW), a scale that records people's views regarding the causes for bad outcomes in life and the belief that bad things do not happen to good people. People who believe in a just world often think that if something unpleasant happened to an individual, he or she must have deserved it. Previous research suggests that just-world beliefs are associated with victim blaming and explain judgments relating to sexual violence (Cameron and Stritzke 2003; Strömwall, Alfredsson and Landström 2013, 213; Alexander 1980, 23).
Although BJW was associated with participants' judgments of the case, we found no mediation relationship, as identifiability did not influence BJW (path a—testing the influence of the independent variable on the proposed mediator—was not significant).

EXPERIMENT 2

Table A2. Means of Victim-Offender Evaluation Gaps Between Identification Conditions for Men and Women Participants

Condition	Sex	Evaluation	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
None Identified	Men	Credibility gap	.931	.183	.573	1.289
		Responsibility gap	1.611	.180	1.258	1.963
		Blame gap	2.214	.205	1.812	2.615
		Morality gap	2.015	.185	1.652	2.378
	Women	Credibility gap	1.603	.186	1.238	1.968
		Responsibility gap	1.889	.183	1.530	2.248
		Blame gap	2.556	.209	2.146	2.965
		Morality gap	2.278	.189	1.908	2.648
Offender Identified	Men	Credibility gap	.177	.188	-.191	.545
		Responsibility gap	.847	.185	.485	1.209
		Blame gap	1.548	.210	1.136	1.961
		Morality gap	1.258	.190	.885	1.631
	Women	Credibility gap	1.579	.186	1.214	1.944
		Responsibility gap	1.889	.183	1.530	2.248
		Blame gap	2.357	.209	1.948	2.767
		Morality gap	2.151	.189	1.781	2.521
Both Identified-Neutral	Men	Credibility gap	.116	.184	-.245	.477
		Responsibility gap	1.140	.181	.785	1.495
		Blame gap	1.388	.206	.983	1.792
		Morality gap	1.380	.186	1.014	1.745
	Women	Credibility gap	1.446	.190	1.074	1.819
		Responsibility gap	1.653	.187	1.286	2.019
		Blame gap	2.372	.213	1.954	2.790
		Morality gap	2.190	.192	1.813	2.568
Both Identified-Passive Identification	Men	Credibility gap	.525	.189	.154	.896
		Responsibility gap	1.492	.186	1.127	1.857
		Blame gap	1.975	.212	1.559	2.392
		Morality gap	1.730	.192	1.354	2.105
	Women	Credibility gap	1.595	.183	1.237	1.953
		Responsibility gap	2.122	.180	1.770	2.474
		Blame gap	2.565	.205	2.163	2.966
		Morality gap	2.527	.185	2.164	2.890
Both Identified-Active Identification	Men	Credibility gap	.268	.185	-.096	.631
		Responsibility gap	1.157	.182	.800	1.515
		Blame gap	1.386	.208	.978	1.794
		Morality gap	1.299	.188	.931	1.668
	Women	Credibility gap	1.453	.178	1.102	1.803
		Responsibility gap	1.467	.176	1.123	1.812
		Blame gap	2.175	.200	1.782	2.568
		Morality gap	1.964	.181	1.609	2.318

Figure A1. The Impact of Identification on Victim-Offender Evaluations of Men and Women Participants in Experiment 2

Mediation analysis

In addition to the mediators described in the main text, we examined participants' perceptions regarding social norms on sexual harassment. We included this potential mediator given the timing of our experiment, at the prime of the #MeToo movement and the public discourse on changing social norms regarding sexual harassment. We built on the distinction offered by Tankard and Paluck (2017) between present social norms and directional norms. Tankard and Paluck tested whether a legal shift—the legalization of same-sex marriage across the U.S. in a Supreme Court decision—influenced perceptions of the social norms regarding same-sex couples. We asked our participants to evaluate (1) the existence of social norms opposing sexual harassment at present, (2) the public support for the legal prohibition on sexual harassment, and (3) the direction towards which the social norm is heading—the extent to which they expect the opposition to sexual harassment to rise or fall in the coming years (See items 2-4 in the Materials Table for Experiment 2, above).

A mediation analysis (using PROCESS, Model 4) yielded that identifiability had little to no effect on social norm perceptions. Active identification of the victim was the only condition that influenced these perceptions, in the form of *reducing* the belief that norms regarding sexual harassment are likely to change (-.36, $p = .01$). Active identification had no influence on the additional social norm measures. Notwithstanding this effect, directional norms did not impact any of the outcome measures (path b was n.s., $p = .93$) and thus did not mediate the relationship between any of the identifiability conditions and their effect on the outcome measures.

Similarly, we analyzed whether participants' personal feelings of distress following reading the scenario mediated their evaluations. Again we found no significant mediation relationship, as identifiability did not influence distress ($p = .125$).

EXPERIMENT 3

Table A3.1. Estimated Marginal Means for the Victim-Offender Average Evaluation at Different Levels of Modern Sexism

Modern Sexism	Identification	Gender Role	Mean Eval.	Std. Error	95% CI Lower Bound	95% CI Upper Bound
Low (at MS=1.81)	None Identified	Female victim	6.347	.108	6.135	6.560
		Male victim	5.926	.114	5.702	6.149
	Identified Offender	Female victim	6.094	.106	5.887	6.301
		Male victim	5.615	.118	5.383	5.846
	ID Offender + Passively ID Victim	Female victim	6.204	.108	5.993	6.415
		Male victim	5.635	.116	5.408	5.863
	ID Offender + Actively ID Victim	Female victim	6.275	.113	6.054	6.496
		Male victim	5.637	.111	5.418	5.855
High (at MS=3.39)	None Identified	Female victim	5.479	.111	5.261	5.696
		Male victim	5.980	.111	5.762	6.198
	Identified Offender	Female victim	5.444	.112	5.224	5.663
		Male victim	5.676	.111	5.458	5.894
	ID Offender + Passively ID Victim	Female victim	5.554	.117	5.324	5.783
		Male victim	5.531	.112	5.312	5.750
	ID Offender + Actively ID Victim	Female victim	5.092	.115	4.867	5.317
		Male victim	5.813	.106	5.604	6.022

Note: The mean evaluation of the victim and offender relative to each other was given on a 1 to 9 scale; a score above 5 indicates that the victim was valuated higher than the offender, and vice versa. The composite of the mean of credibility, blame, and morality is evaluated at ±1 SD from the mean of MS.

Table A3.2. Means of Sexual Harassment Determinations Between Identification and Gender Role Conditions for Men and Women Participants

ID	Gender Role	Participant's Gender	Mean	Std. Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
					95% CI	
None Identified	Female victim	Men	3.806	.153	3.507	4.11
		Women	4.775	.145	4.491	5.059
	Male victim	Men	3.655	.144	3.372	3.938
		Women	4.050	.156	3.745	4.356
Identified Offender	Female victim	Men	3.548	.153	3.249	3.848
		Women	4.308	.147	4.019	4.598
	Male victim	Men	3.458	.149	3.167	3.749
		Women	4.082	.154	3.780	4.384
Identified Offender + Passively Identified Victim	Female victim	Men	3.690	.158	3.380	3.999
		Women	4.194	.142	3.916	4.472
	Male victim	Men	3.439	.153	3.138	3.740
		Women	3.811	.151	3.515	4.107
Identified Offender + Actively Identified Victim	Female victim	Men	3.215	.155	2.912	3.518
		Women	4.147	.146	3.861	4.433
	Male victim	Men	3.580	.139	3.308	3.852
		Women	3.809	.162	3.491	4.127

Figure A2. The Impact of Identification and Gender Roles at the Mean Level of Modern Sexism

Notes: The left panel presents the mean victim-offender evaluation (who is more credible and moral, and less blameworthy) as a function of Identification and Gender Role at MS Mean = 2.6. The right panel presents the mean sexual harassment determination as a function of the same. The figure complements Figure 6 in the main text, which plots the same for Low and High MS.

Mediation analysis
We examined the following additional mediators: victim and offender character judgments, female and male harassment prevalence perceptions, personal fears of harassment, political affiliation, and religious affiliation. Due to the multifaceted structure of the data (two between-subject factors), we did not use the Hayes mediation module and examined the mediation paths directly.

Offender character judgments
We examined whether stereotypical views mediate the identifiability effect by presenting traits at random and asking participants to rate the extent to which the victim and the offender had these traits from 1 ("not at all") to 7 ("very much") (drawing on Fisk et al.'s 2002 work on warmth/competence). The list included traits associated with masculinity (strong, confident, competent), femininity (weak, warm, hysterical), and negative stereotypes of women complainants (manipulative, vindictive, publicity seeking).
In general, offender character traits did not appear to mediate the identifiability effect, as judgments thereof were not generally influenced by identifiability—with the exception of "manipulative." The offender was perceived as least manipulative when the victim was actively identified, compared with the control condition (path a; $F_{(3,2053)}$=2.75, p = .042). Gender Role also significantly influenced manipulative ratings, as female offenders were perceived as *less* manipulative than male offenders ($F_{(1,2053)}$=6.39, p = .012), and the interaction between Identification and Gender Role was marginally significant ($F_{(3,2053)}$=2.29, p = .076).
Gender Role significantly influenced character judgments regarding the offender. In general, female offenders were perceived more favorably than male offenders. Male offenders were viewed as less competent, weaker, and less brave than female offenders, but also less publicity seeking. Men and women participants generally shared the same views regarding the offender, except for "manipulative" judgments, as women perceived a male offender as more manipulative than men did.
Accounting for the offender perception as manipulative mediated the impact of Identification on the victim-offender average evaluations and sexual harassment determinations (path c' became n.s., F_{SHD}=1.99, p = .114, $F_{Evaluations}$=1.65, p = .177).

Victim character judgments
In general, victim character traits did not mediate the identifiability effect, as most of the judgments thereof were not influenced by identifiability. However, identification significantly influenced "publicity-seeking" judgments, as both female and male victims were perceived as least publicity-seeking in the passive identification condition (path a; $F_{(3,2053)}$=4.358, p = .005)*. There was no interaction with Gender Role. Publicity-seeking also had a significant effect on victim-offender evaluations and on sexual harassment determinations (path b; p's < .0001). However, the effect of Identification on the DVs remained highly significant with publicity-seeking in the model (path c; p's < .01), and the inclusion of publicity-seeking did not reduce the significance of any of the effects that were previously significant (it did transform borderline effects to n.s. and improved the significance of one n.s. effect). In short, publicity seeking's mediating effect was nonexistent or marginal at best.

Harassment prevalence perceptions
Perceptions regarding the prevalence of sexual harassment experienced by women versus by men varied greatly, as men were generally perceived to experience significantly less sexual harassment than women. However, these measures were not influenced by Identification or by

the Identification and Gender Role interaction term (path a was n.s., with *p* values ranging from .17 to .89).

Fear of being harassed or falsely accused of harassment

Most participants in our study did not fear being sexually harassed or being falsely accused of sexual harassment. On both measures (on a scale of 1 to 7, from "not at all" to "very much"), the mode was 1 and the average was 3 (SD = 2.1). Distribution of both measures was skewed to the "not at all" side and was very similar. None of these variables was significantly influenced by Identification or by the Identification*Gender Role interaction (path a was n.s.). In short, none of these measures mediated the effects.

Political affiliation

As expected given recent electoral trends, our sample leaned to the right. Political affiliation was measured on a scale that ranged from 1 (very right wing) to 7 (very left wing) with 4 (center) as the scale midpoint, M=3.44, SD=1.44. We also received participants' self-reported 2015 vote in the national elections, according to which we classified them as right wing (N=716), center (N=353), left wing (N=543), and 'other' (did not vote, did not say, N=358). Political affiliation negatively and significantly correlated with modern sexism (MS), $r = -.285$, p<.001, such that people with high MS scores were also significantly more affiliated with the right wing. However, neither political affiliation nor vote-based classification moderate the identifiability effect.

Religious affiliation

We received data on participants' religious affiliation (secular, traditional, religious, ultra-Orthodox) from the survey company. Due to relative scarcity of ultra-Orthodox participants (roughly 10% of the sample, approximately their share in the population), we combined the latter two categories into one 'religious' category. Religiosity correlated with MS, $r=.23$, p<.001, such that religious people were somewhat more likely to have high MS scores. However, religious affiliation did not moderate the identifiability effect or the identifiability*gender role interaction.